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Revenue cycle management — all clinical and administrative activities related to 
generating and collecting patient revenue — has gained in importance in today’s business 
environment, in which hospitals are confronted with stricter regulations and billing 
requirements, underpayments, and greater delays in payments. Despite the continued 
interest of practitioners, revenue cycle management has not received much attention in 
health care finance research. The three studies that comprise this dissertation seek to 
complement anecdotal evidence and fill some of the gaps in the literature by defining and 
exploring the financial benefits hospitals derive from effectively managing the revenue 
cycle. 
The first study describes current revenue cycle management practices and 
develops measures of their financial benefits in terms of increases in the amount and the 
speed of patient revenue collection. Using financial statement information for California 
hospitals for 2004–2007, correlation analysis shows that hospitals that collect their 
revenues faster tend to record higher revenues indicating that there is no trade-off but that 
these financial benefits of effective revenue cycle management often go hand in hand. 
The second study explores the determinants of revenue cycle management 
performance with a particular focus on hospitals’ payer mix. Using data from Medicare 





2007, fixed effects regression analysis finds that hospitals serving more Medicare patients 
collect somewhat more revenue while also collecting their revenue faster. Higher 
Medicaid payer mix, on the other hand, is associated with neither the amount nor the 
speed of revenue collection. Unlike frequently claimed by hospital managers, government 
payers therefore do not appear to undermine hospitals’ ability to generate and collect 
patient revenue.  
The third study analyzes the link between revenue cycle management and 
hospitals’ long-term financial performance. Fixed effects regression analysis of audited 
financial statement information for bond-issuing, not-for-profit hospitals for 2000–2007 
finds that effective revenue cycle management has the potential to boost not-for-profit 
hospitals’ profitability and strengthen their ability to grow equity. This link is particularly 
strong for measures of operating performance indicating that the pathway through which 















Despite a recent slowdown, the growth in hospital spending continues to outpace the 
growth in the resources available to pay for it. Over the past two decades, hospital 
expenditures have increased by an average of seven percent per year reaching $718.4 
billion, or $2,360 per person, in 2008 (Hartman et al. 2010). As a result, there is 
tremendous pressure on key industry stakeholders to mitigate further growth in hospital 
spending (D’Cruz and Welter 2008). Government health care programs, such as 
Medicare and Medicaid, have responded to these pressures by mandating lower increases 
in hospital reimbursement rates. Consequently, Medicare and Medicaid now frequently 
pay hospitals less than what it costs to treat their beneficiaries resulting in payment 
shortfalls for hospitals (American Hospital Association 2009). Hospitals also feel 
significant pressures to contain health care costs from private health insurers and large 
employers, which use their market power to squeeze payment and create bureaucratic 
hassles for health care providers (D’Cruz and Welter 2008).  
Historically, hospitals have mainly focused on cost management to deal with 
these pressures (Gapenski, Vogel, and Langland-Orban 1993). Cost containment efforts 
alone, however, may not be sufficient in the complex revenue cycle management 
environment that hospital managers are facing today. Considerable changes in hospital 




the 1980s, the formation of managed care organizations in the 1990s, and the growth in 
consumer driven health plans in the 2000s have intensified the need for hospitals to 
maintain and stabilize revenue streams and improve collection efforts (D’Cruz and 
Welter 2008; Gapenski, Vogel, and Langland-Orban 1993). In today’s business 
environment, cost management has thus diminished as a single predictor of hospitals’ 
financial performance while revenue cycle management has gained in importance.  
Hospital revenue cycle management includes all clinical and administrative 
functions related to the generation, management, and collection of patient care revenue. 
Although historically focused on back end tasks, such as billing and collections, in recent 
years hospital financial managers have directed more of their attention to the front end of 
the revenue cycle including patient scheduling and registration, insurance verification, 
and preauthorization as well as the core tasks of the revenue cycle including medical 
documentation and coding (Berger 2008; Rauscher and Wheeler 2008). Up-to-date, well-
operated practices at the front end of the revenue cycle allow hospitals to improve their 
performance at back end tasks and thus generate greater amounts of patient revenue and 
collect it in a timely fashion (Zelman et al. 2003). Advances in technology, for instance, 
allow patients to schedule appointments and complete online registration information 
conveniently over the internet. Likewise, integrating core tasks, such as the 
documentation of patient care and medical coding, into the revenue cycle has become 
paramount to insuring appropriate billing and claims collection at the back end. 
Specialized coding software, for instance, allows hospitals to substantially improve the 
accuracy of medical coding, which will become even more important once the currently 




The importance many hospital financial managers currently attribute to effective 
revenue cycle management is also reflected in their hiring of external management 
consultants. Hospitals’ need to maintain and stabilize revenue streams and improve 
collections has thus sparked the creation of a new industry of consultancies that 
specialize in helping their clients improve their performance at managing the revenue 
cycle. Examples include AccretiveHealth, McKesson, and Stockamp, to name but a few 
of the players in this new and growing industry. 
 
Definition of and background on hospital revenue cycle management 
For the purpose of this dissertation, hospital revenue cycle management is defined as the 
practices a hospital designs and implements to maximize both the amount of patient 
revenue and the speed of patient revenue collection. Due to the complex interrelations 
among patients, providers, payers, and regulators that characterize the U.S. health care 
system, the way hospitals manage patient revenues and accounts receivable differs 
substantially from that in firms in most other industries. First, hospitals differ from other 
firms in terms of managing their revenues. Unlike the prices charged of customers by 
most firms, the prices hospitals bill for services are generally not the prices that patients 
and third-party payers end up paying. Instead, hospitals bill for services based on the 
price information listed in their charge masters but then grant third-party payers 
substantial discounts in the form of contractual allowances. An average hospital may 
have several hundred different contractual relationships with third-party payers, each of 
which specifies a different set of payment rates for specific services (Berger 2008). 




of charity care, for which they decide to forgo revenue altogether. As a result, the net 
patient revenues — defined as gross charges minus the sum of contractual allowances 
and charity care — that hospitals earn are much lower than the charges billed. Moreover, 
hospitals frequently incur additional revenue write-offs in the form of bad debt expenses 
whenever patients, in particular self-pay patients and patient enrolled in high-deductible 
health plans, are able but unwilling to pay their bills.  
Second, hospitals differ from firms in other industries in their approach to 
managing accounts receivable. While in most industries the customer pays the provider 
directly for the goods or services rendered, hospital care is to a large extent paid for by 
third-party payers, such as government programs, commercial insurers, and managed care 
organizations. Investments in accounts receivable are thus an operational necessity for 
hospitals (Duncan, Swayne, and Ginter 1998) and since most third-party payers are 
volume purchasers, hospitals are also confronted with the problem of trying to externally 
control the timely payment of accounts (Zelman et al. 2003). Moreover, given the nature 
of the demand for hospital care, changes in hospitals’ terms of credit are unlikely to 
stimulate volume and improve profitability and hospitals typically incur all the costs but 
derive few, if any, of the benefits associated with the extension of credit (Duncan, 
Swayne, and Ginter 1998). Hence, the applicability of revenue cycle management tools 
and techniques employed in other industries to the U.S. hospital industry is limited. 
Instead, hospital managers have developed industry-specific revenue cycle management 
policies and practices that allow them to maximize both the amount and the speed of 





Empirical evidence on hospital revenue cycle management  
Despite the continued interest of practitioners (Danielson and Fuller 2007; D’Cruz and 
Welter 2008; May 2004), hospital revenue cycle management has not received much 
attention in health care finance research. Instead, the overwhelming majority of 
publications on revenue cycle management are based on the insights and experiences of 
practitioners working in the field. These publications develop ad hoc performance 
measures and standards, discuss anecdotal evidence of potentially important factors of 
effective revenue cycle management, and offer suggestions for improvements at other 
hospitals based on the experiences gained at the authors' institutions.  
The few existing empirical studies of hospital revenue cycle management are 
mainly exploratory studies that fall in two categories. The first group consists of studies 
that analyze factors associated with the financial benefits of hospital revenue cycle 
management performance, such Prince and Ramanan’s (1992) paper on hospitals’ 
collection performance. The second group represents studies of hospitals’ profitability 
that include single measures of revenue cycle management performance as explanatory 
variables, such as average collection periods and mark-up ratios (Cleverley 1990; Cody, 
Friss, and Hawkinson 1995; Gapenski, Vogel, and Langland-Orban 1993). None of these 
studies, however, takes into account that effective revenue cycle management may result 
in not just one but multiple financial benefits. In addition, the empirical methods 
employed in the above mentioned studies are largely limited to correlation and simple 






Scope and structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation seeks to complement anecdotal evidence on hospital revenue cycle 
management and fill some of the gaps in the health care finance literature by defining and 
exploring the financial benefits of effective revenue cycle management from the 
perspective of hospitals. It consists of three papers that address the following questions: 
1. What are the financial benefits of effective hospital revenue cycle management? 
Is there a trade-off between the amount of patient revenue hospitals earn and the 
speed with which they collect patient revenue? 
2. What are the determinants of hospital revenue cycle management performance? 
How does payer mix, in particular the proportion of publicly insured patients, 
affect hospitals’ revenue cycle management performance? Do government payers 
indeed undermine hospitals’ ability to generate and collect patient revenue as is 
frequently claimed by hospital practitioners? 
3. What is the link between revenue cycle management performance and hospitals’ 
long-term financial viability? Does effective revenue cycle management improve 
hospitals’ profitability? Does effective revenue cycle management strengthen 
hospitals’ ability to grow equity capital? 
 
Chapter 2 briefly describes current hospital revenue cycle management practices. 
It then develops and discusses measures of the financial benefits of effective revenue 
cycle management in terms of increases in the amount and the speed of patient revenue 
collection. Then, Chapter 2 seeks to answer the question whether there is a trade-off 




is collected. Are hospitals with lower average collection periods also able to perform well 
at maximizing the amount of patient revenue they collect? Or is there a trade-off between 
the amount of patient revenue a hospital collects and its speed of revenue collection? 
Chapter 3 analyzes the determinants of hospitals’ revenue cycle management 
performance with a particular focus on payer mix, i.e., the proportions of a hospital’s 
Medicare, Medicaid, privately insured, and uninsured patients. What is the link between 
payer mix and hospitals’ performance at managing the revenue cycle? Are there 
differences between different payer groups and do government payers indeed undermine 
hospitals’ ability to generate and collect patient care revenue as is frequently claimed by 
hospital managers?  
Chapter 4 explores the long-term financial benefits that hospitals are able to 
derive from effective revenue cycle management. In particular, Chapter 4 analyzes the 
link between hospitals’ revenue cycle management performance and their profitability 
and ability to grow equity capital. Does effective revenue cycle management allow 
hospital managers to remain profitable, build equity capital, and thus strengthen the long-
term financial viability of their organizations? 
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and concludes before discussing several 
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Chapter 2  
 
Effective Hospital Revenue Cycle Management: Is There a Trade-off Between the 
Amount of Patient Revenue and the Speed of Revenue Collection? 
 
Abstract 
Effective hospital revenue cycle management practices have gained in importance in 
today’s hospital business environment, in which many hospitals are confronted with 
stricter regulations and billing requirements, more thorough preauthorization and 
precertification, underpayments, and greater delays in payments. In this article, we 
provide a brief description of current hospital revenue cycle management practices. Next, 
we suggest measures of the financial benefits of revenue cycle management in terms of 
increases in the amount and speed of patient revenue collection. We consider whether 
there is a trade-off between the amount of patient revenue a hospital earns and the speed 
with which revenue is collected.  
Using financial statement data from California hospitals for 2004 to 2007, we test 
empirically the relationships among key financial measures of effective hospital revenue 
cycle management. We find that hospitals with higher speeds of revenue collection tend 
to record higher amounts of net patient revenue per adjusted discharge, lower contractual 
allowances, and lower bad debts. Charity care provision, on the other hand, tends to be 
higher among hospitals with higher speeds of revenue collection. We conclude that there 




revenue collection but that these financial benefits of effective hospital revenue cycle 
management often go hand in hand. We thus provide early indication that these outcomes 
are complementary, suggesting that effective hospital revenue cycle management 
achieves multiple positive results.  
 
Introduction 
The continuing efforts of public and private third-party payers to contain hospital costs 
have resulted in stricter regulations and billing requirements, more thorough 
preauthorization and precertification, underpayments, and greater delays in payments 
(Anderson 1988; Krantz 2006; Ladewig and Hecht 1993). As a result, short-term 
financial management, particularly the management of patient revenues and accounts 
receivable, has significantly gained in importance, and hospitals across the United States 
increasingly feel the need to implement effective revenue cycle management practices. 
Traditionally, hospital revenue cycle management has focused on reducing the 
average collection period, most frequently measured as days in net accounts receivable, 
which is equal to net accounts receivable times 365 days divided by net patient revenues. 
A shorter average collection period implies that the hospital receives cash inflows from 
providing patient care earlier. Each reduction in days in net accounts receivable translates 
into a one-time financial benefit by reducing outstanding accounts receivable balances 
and increasing cash holdings. As a result, the hospital reduces its opportunity costs of 




that is created on the balance sheet can be invested in interest-bearing financial 
instruments, or it can reduce the need for short-term borrowing. 
 One way for hospital financial managers to reduce the average collection period is 
to write off outstanding patient accounts more quickly (Hammer 2005; Nowicki 2008). 
This results in smaller balances of net accounts receivable and thus lower days in net 
accounts receivable. However, writing off patient accounts prematurely reduces operating 
profits. Evaluating the performance of revenue cycle management solely in terms of the 
average collection period thus ignores the second important financial benefit of effective 
revenue cycle management: maximizing the amount of patient revenue the hospital 
collects. Although the speed with which accounts receivable are converted into cash has 
important implications for a hospital’s liquidity, the magnitude of net patient revenue 
directly affects profitability and the ability to build equity to ensure the hospital’s long-
term financial viability (Danielson and Fuller 2007; Wood 2007).  
 This article briefly describes current hospital revenue cycle management 
practices. It then develops and discusses measures of effective revenue cycle 
management in terms of increases in the amount and speed of patient revenue collection. 
We then seek to answer the question of whether there is a trade-off between the amount 
of patient revenue a hospital earns and the speed with which revenue is collected. 
 
Hospital revenue cycle management  
For the purpose of this study, hospital revenue cycle management is defined as the 




and the speed of patient revenue collection. Figure 2.1 identifies the most important 
elements of the hospital revenue cycle, divided into front-end, core, and back-end tasks, 
that help the hospital achieve these goals. 
Effective revenue cycle management requires that the revenue cycle manager, 
supported by a revenue cycle management team, develop and implement both revenue 
cycle policies and procedures and performance measures and standards, which are 
intended not only to standardize and optimize procedures but also to help overcome the 
silo structure of managing the revenue cycle that can be found in many hospitals 
(Eldenburg, Schafer, and Zulauf 2004). A crucial aspect is revenue cycle-friendly third-
party payer contracting, which includes negotiating patient volumes, prices, and 
contractual allowances as well as payment terms and timing (Berger 2008; Eldenburg, 
Schafer, and Zulauf 2004). The objectives of hospitals in contract negotiations with third-
party payers have changed in recent years. Although hospitals have traditionally focused 
on obtaining and maintaining patient volumes, even at the expense of optimal financial 
performance, many hospitals now aggressively negotiate their financial arrangements 
with third-party payers to increase both the overall amount of patient revenue and the 




Figure 2.1: The Hospital Revenue Cycle 
Before patient contact: 
 
Development and implementation of revenue cycle management policies, procedures, performance 
measures, and standards 
Third-party payer contract negotiation and management 
 
 










Provision of services and medical documentation 
 
 
Typical duration: 15–19 days
a
 










Billing, claims preparation, and claims editing 
Follow-up and denials management 
 
 
Typical duration: 57–68 days
b
 
(measured as days in accounts receivable) 
 





 Based on a national academic faculty practice plan survey, average charge entry lags were 19 days 
for inpatient and 15 days for outpatients (May 2004). Newitt and Robertson (2007) recommend a 
benchmark of five days for billing turnaround, measured from date of service or discharge. If measured 
from date of service, this benchmark would imply a charge entry lag of fewer than five days. 
b 
Median 
values for days in net accounts receivable have been decreasing steadily since 2000 for all U.S. hospitals. 
In 2003, the median value for days in net accounts receivable was 57.22 days, down from 68.44 days in 
1999 (Solucient 2005). Newitt and Robertson (2007) recommend benchmarks of 52 days or fewer in days 
in gross account receivable and 48 days or fewer in days in net accounts receivable, whereas Hammer 




 Although historically focused on billing and collection, in recent years hospital 
managers have directed more of their attention to the front end of the revenue cycle. 
Starting with appointment scheduling and continuing through registration, a hospital staff 
member registers the patient; collects the patient’s demographic, clinical, and insurance 
information; verifies the insurance information; and validates the type of coverage 
provided by the health plan and the eligibility of the patient for services to be provided, 
which frequently requires obtaining a referral or preauthorization of services (Cleverley 
and Cameron 2007).  
During registration, two activities are especially important for the hospital to be 
able to maximize the amount of patient revenue and the speed of revenue collection: 
computing the deductibles and copayments to provide patients with information about 
how much they are expected to pay out of pocket and providing patient financial 
education and counseling to help identify patients who have no or only limited health 
insurance coverage but may be eligible for a public health insurance program, such as 
Medicare, Medicaid, or State Children’s Health Insurance Program (Rappuhn 2003). 
These activities reduce the amount of staff time spent preparing bills and the amount of 
outstanding self-pay patient balances and increase the speed of revenue collection and the 
likelihood that the account will be paid off, thereby reducing bad debts expense (May 
2004). 
 Providing healthcare services to patients is the core business of a hospital and the 
stage of the hospital revenue cycle during which revenue is generated. Under the 
prevalent reimbursement systems based on diagnosis-related groups, the patient’s 




reimbursement the hospital can seek. Therefore, an important aspect of providing service 
is documenting all services provided in the patient’s medical record, parts of which are 
used in the billing process and communicated to third-party payers to trigger appropriate 
payment (Cleverley and Cameron 2007). Whenever services are provided it is imperative 
that charges for those services be captured and entered into the hospital’s information 
system because a service that is rendered, but not entered as a charge, will not be billed 
and thus will not produce patient revenue. Moreover, the length of time from point of 
service to charge entry is a critical factor in the effectiveness of hospital revenue cycle 
management, as lags in charge entry result in delays in billing and cash collection and 
reduce the speed of revenue collection (May 2004). As a final step, before a bill can be 
prepared, each case has to be assigned a diagnosis and a procedure code (Cleverley and 
Cameron 2007). Accurate and detailed medical documentation gives medical coders the 
opportunity to apply for the optimal level of reimbursement and thus maximize the 
amount of patient revenue (Berger 2008).  
 Back-end tasks, such as billing and collection, are the areas most readily 
identified with revenue cycle management (Wood 2007). Up-to-date, well-operated 
billing policies and procedures help prepare accurate and timely bills (Zelman et al. 
2003). An important task in the billing process is claims editing, which aims to detect 
potential errors in claims before they are submitted to payers, thereby ensuring that the 
hospital receives the maximum payment for the services provided and shortening the time 
from claim submission to actual payment (Cleverley and Cameron 2007). When bills are 
not paid in a timely manner, follow-ups and denial management can help the hospital 




whereby previously denied claims are corrected and resubmitted (Eldenburg, Schafer, 
and Zulauf 2004). At the same time, effective denials management can help decrease the 
time accounts receivable are outstanding. The hospital revenue cycle ends with the 
collection and posting of the cash received. Once the payment is received and posted, the 
patient’s account is reconciled by recognizing (additional) contractual allowances, charity 
care services, or bad debt.  
 
The effectiveness of revenue cycle management 
As described in the previous section, some components of hospital revenue cycle 
management focus on increasing the speed of revenue collection and some focus on 
increasing the amount of net patient revenue. Hence, assessing the effectiveness of 
revenue cycle management depends on identifying ways to measure the amount and the 
speed of revenue collection. This section describes some key financial measures of 
effective hospital revenue cycle management. It then examines empirically the 
relationships among these key financial measures. We specifically seek to answer the 
question of whether hospitals with lower average collection periods are also able to 
perform well at maximizing the amount of net patient revenue they collect or whether 
there is a trade-off between the amount of patient revenue a hospital collects and its speed 
of revenue collection. This trade-off could arise if processes aimed at increasing the 






Hospital managers may use a number of key financial indicators to assess the overall 
effectiveness of the hospital’s revenue cycle management activities as presented in Table 
2.1. The most common measure of the speed of patient revenue collection is days in net 
accounts receivable, which is calculated as net accounts receivable times 365 days 
divided by net patient revenue (Berger 2008; Hammer 2005; May 2004; Prince and 
Ramachandran 1992; Quist and Robertson 2004). This financial ratio describes the 
number of days of net patient revenue that a hospital has due from patient billings after 
taking deductions for charity care, contractual allowances, and expected bad debts. 
Therefore, days in net accounts receivable indicates the average time a hospital’s patient 
accounts receivable are outstanding or the average collection period on patient accounts. 
Median values for days in net accounts receivable have been decreasing steadily since 
2000 for all U.S. hospitals from longer than 68 days to less than 55 days, a decrease that 
is likely caused by hospitals’ devotion to better revenue cycle management (Solucient 
2005). 
 Besides the speed of revenue collection, we argue that an equally important result 
of revenue cycle management is the amount of patient revenue a hospital collects, which 
is measured as net patient revenue per adjusted discharge (Solucient 2005). For the 
purpose of this study, net patient revenue is defined as the difference between gross 
patient revenue and the sum of contractual allowances, charity care, and bad debt. Net 
patient revenue per adjusted discharge contains three different adjustments to allow 
values to be compared across hospitals. First, wage index adjustments are made to control 




locations. Second, case-mix index adjustments are made to account for differences in the 
severity of illness of the patients treated at different hospitals. Third, net patient revenue 
is adjusted for the amount of outpatient business of the hospital to take into account that 
hospitals with a greater proportion of outpatients, on average, earn lower net patient 
revenues per discharge. 
According to generally accepted accounting principles, net patient revenue is the 
difference between gross patient revenue, that is, the price charged to patients and 
provisions for contractual allowances and charity care. Additional adjustments to net 
patient revenues are made in the form of bad debt expense to account for patients who are 
able but unwilling to pay. U.S. hospitals frequently collect less than half of their gross 
patient revenue. To gain a better understanding of the composition of the revenue 
deductions, that is, those parts of a hospital’s gross patient revenues that are recorded but 
not collected (Griffith 1995), hospital managers frequently calculate contractual 
allowance, charity care, and bad debt percentages. The contractual allowance percentage 
indicates how much of a hospital’s gross patient revenue is not collected by the hospital 
because of discounts granted to third-party payers. In this article, contractual allowances 
include allowances granted to Medicare, Medi-Cal (not taking into account 
disproportionate share payments), county programs for the indigent, and private insurers. 
The charity care percentage specifies how much of a hospital’s gross patient revenue is 
not collected because of the provision of charity care. For the purpose of this study, 
charity care includes charity care provided under the Hill-Burton Act as well as other 
charity care. The bad debt percentage shows how much of gross patient revenue the 








Definition Formula Financial 
Benefit 
Days in net 
accounts 
receivable 
Number of days required to 
collect on charges for care 
provided to patients 
(Net accounts receivable × 







Average net patient revenue 
per discharge adjusted for 
wage index, case mix index, 
and the proportion of 
outpatient business of the 
hospital 
(([Net patient revenue × 
0.71 ÷ Wage index] + 
[Net patient revenue × 
0.29]) ÷ Adjusted 
discharges) ÷ Case mix 
index  
 
Adjusted discharges = 
Total discharges × Gross 






Percentage of gross patient 
revenue that is discounted to 
third-party payers 
Contractual allowances ÷ 




Percentage of gross patient 
revenue that is provided as 
charity care 





Percentage of gross patient 
revenue that is written off as 
bad debt 





Data and sample 
The data used to analyze the relationships among the key financial indicators of effective 
hospital revenue cycle management were derived from the annual hospital financial 
disclosure reports submitted by California hospitals to the Office of Statewide Health 
Planning and Development (OSHPD). Financial data for California hospitals with fiscal 
years ending during calendar years 2004 to 2007 were examined. The sample used in this 
study contains 1,513 hospitals: 381 hospitals in 2004, 365 hospitals in 2005, 386 




all California hospitals reporting financial information to the OSHPD for these four 
years. (Roughly ten to 20 percent of hospitals were excluded in each year mainly because 
of incomplete reporting of financial information to the OSHPD.) 
 
Analysis 
To test the relationships among the financial measures defined previously, nonparametric 
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients were calculated for each year between 2004 and 
2007 as well as for the total sample of hospitals spanning the four-year study period from 
2004 to 2007. Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients were used in the analysis because 
they represent a nonparametric measure of correlation assessing how well an arbitrary 
monotonic function could describe the relationship between two variables, without 
making any assumptions about the frequency distribution of the variables. This analysis 
thus allowed us to determine whether there were any—not necessarily linear—
relationships between any two of the five key financial measures of effective revenue 




Between 2004 and 2007, median days in net accounts receivable in California hospitals 
increased by 2.64 days from 57.07 days to 59.71 days. Median net patient revenues per 
adjusted discharge increased by $1,068, or 13.7 percent, from $7,787 in 2004 to $8,855 in 




by two percentage points, from 65 percent in 2004 to 67 percent in 2007, and the 
proportion of gross patient revenue written off as bad debt expense decreased by 0.4 
percentage points, from 1.9 percent in 2004 to 1.5 percent in 2007. The proportion of 
gross patient revenue provided as charity care remained relatively stable at around 0.5 
percent of gross patient revenue over the four-year study period. 
 
Relationships among measures of patient revenue 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the relationships between net patient revenue per 
adjusted discharge and the three types of revenue deductions—contractual allowances, 
charity care, and bad debt. As expected, all correlation coefficients are small but 
consistently negative and relatively stable across time. The correlation coefficients 
between net patient revenue per adjusted discharge and the contractual allowance 
percentage range from –0.17 to –0.32, those between net patient revenue per adjusted 
discharge and the charity care percentage range from –0.08 to –0.13, and those between 
net patient revenue per adjusted discharge and the bad debt percentage range from –0.18 
to –0.24. For the four-year sample, the respective correlation coefficients are –0.24,         
–0.10, and –0.22, indicating that hospitals with fewer revenue deductions have on 






Table 2.2: Relationship among Measures of the Amount of Patient Revenue 
  Net Patient Revenue per Adjusted Discharge 
      





      
Contractual allowance  –0.2116 –0.3189 –0.3129 –0.1677 –0.2411 
percentage (.0001) (.0000) (.0000) (.0010) (.0000) 
      
Charity care percentage –0.0942 –0.1298 –0.1107 –0.0808 –0.0952 
 (.0746) (.0148) (.0320) (.1154) (.0003) 
      
Bad debt percentage –0.2401 –0.2080 –0.2412 –0.1812 –0.2243 
 (.0000) (.0001) (.0000) (.0004) (.0000) 
 
Notes: Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients and p values in parentheses. 
 
 
Relationships among measures of the amount and the speed of patient revenue 
collection 
Table 2.3 shows the relationships among measures of the amount and speed of patient 
revenue collection. The first row shows Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients between 
days in net accounts receivable and net patient revenue per adjusted discharge, the two 
most important measures of effective hospital revenue cycle management in this study. 
The correlation coefficients are small but consistently negative with the exception of the 
year 2007. They range in magnitude from –0.13 to 0.05 with a correlation coefficient of  






Table 2.3: Relationships among Measures of the Amount and the Speed of Patient 
Revenue Collection 
  Days in Net Accounts Receivable 
      
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
2004–
2007 
      
Net patient revenue per  –0.1250 –0.1112 –0.0627 0.0463 –0.0509 
adjusted discharge (.0178) (.0371) (.2261) (.3671) (.0515) 
      
Contractual allowance 0.0287 0.0866 0.0672 0.1728 0.0954 
Percentage (.5763) (.0986) (.1874) (.0005) (.0002) 
      
Charity care percentage –0.1322 –0.1100 –0.1224 –0.0275 –0.0925 
 (.0098) (.0356) (.0161) (.5834) (.0003) 
      
Bad debt percentage 0.1153 0.0607 0.0379 0.0935 0.0755 
 (.0244) (.2472) (.4573) (.0616) (.0031) 
 
Notes: Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients and p values in parentheses. 
 
The second to fourth rows in Table 2.3 shed light on how hospitals with lower 
average collection periods fare with respect to the revenue deductions they encounter 
compared with hospitals with higher average collection periods. The correlations between 
days in net accounts receivable and the contractual allowance percentage are small but 
consistently positive and fairly stable, ranging from 0.03 to 0.17. A similar pattern can be 
observed for the correlations between days in net accounts receivable and the bad debt 
percentage. Ranging from 0.04 to 0.12, the correlation coefficients are small but positive 
and relatively stable. None of the correlations for individual years, however, are 
statistically significant at the one percent confidence level (with the exception of the 
correlation coefficient between days in net accounts receivable and the contractual 
allowance percentage for the year 2007). Although the days in net accounts receivable 




debt percentage, it is negatively correlated with the charity care percentage; correlation 
coefficients range from –0.03 to –0.13 for the four individual years, all of which are 
significant at the 5 percent confidence level with the exception of the year 2007. 
 
Discussion 
Our discussion of the hospital revenue cycle demonstrated its complexity and the 
interrelations among many of its stages. Both our brief review of these processes and our 
empirical results suggest that activities to increase the amount of patient revenue and the 
speed with which the hospital collects its patient revenue often go hand in hand. It is 
reasonable to conclude that if a hospital has a comprehensive revenue cycle management 
program it can expect not only to increase its speed of revenue collection by reducing its 
average collection period but also to collect higher amounts of patient revenue per 
adjusted discharge. Therefore, our results do not support a view that there is a trade-off 
between the amount of patient revenue and the speed of revenue collection. For hospital 
revenue cycle managers and consultants working to improve the effectiveness of their 
hospitals’ or clients’ revenue cycle management activities, these results are good news. 
They provide seminal empirical evidence that hospitals wishing to improve their revenue 
cycle management activities do not appear to sacrifice revenues for shortened collection 
periods.  
 As expected, hospitals with higher net patient revenue per adjusted discharge are 
more likely to record lower revenue deductions. Perhaps as part of an aggressive revenue 




to third-party payers, provide less charity care, and minimize their bad debt expenses. For 
the purpose of this study, contractual allowances, charity care, and bad debt are directly 
related to net patient revenue because net patient revenue is calculated as the difference 
between gross patient revenue and these revenue deductions. As a result, the findings for 
contractual allowances, charity care, and bad debt are consistent with what many 
researchers and practitioners would expect.  
The relationship between revenue deductions and average collection periods is 
less clear. On the one hand, hospitals with shorter average collection periods have 
reduced contractual allowances and bad debt expenses, again suggesting that these results 
of effective revenue cycle management are complementary. The negative relationship 
between the average collection period and the bad debt percentage indicates that hospital 
financial managers do not appear to reduce the average collection period by writing off 
outstanding patient accounts more quickly. On the other hand, however, hospitals with 
shorter average collection periods also tend to provide slightly more charity care than 
hospitals with higher average collection periods. This result is the only bivariate result 
with inconsistent findings in terms of revenue cycle management outcomes. A fuller 
understanding of this result, as well as of all the bivariate results presented here, awaits 
multivariate analysis of a larger and more representative set of observations.  
 One set of factors meriting further scrutiny is changes in the patient population 
base that could be associated with a shift in payer mix or could permit increases in 
hospital-charged prices. Our analysis cannot rule out the possibility that the apparent 
complementary nature of the amount and speed of patient revenue collection is due more 




management processes. Hospitals charging higher prices on their charge masters are 
likely able to increase their net patient revenue per adjusted discharge and, at the same 
time, reduce their average collection period. Although higher prices have an immediate 
effect on gross and net patient revenues, they also lead to lower days in net accounts 
receivable if the increase in prices, and thus gross and net patient revenues, is larger than 
the resulting increase in net accounts receivable. Similarly, a shift in the hospital’s payer 
mix, that is, the percentage mix of public and private third-party payers, may result in 
higher net patient revenues per adjusted discharge as a result of reduced revenue 
deductions and, at the same time, reduced average collection periods if the increase in net 
patient revenue is larger than the increase in net accounts receivable.  
 
Study limitations and future work 
This research has a number of limitations that might affect the results of this study and 
limit their generalizability. First of all, the sample only includes California hospitals, 
which are unique in many respects but particularly in terms of property tax limitations, 
the mixture of not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals, and the types of geographic and 
socioeconomic market conditions they face (Clement, Smith, and Wheeler 1994). Thus, 
the precise results derived from this study of California hospitals might not be 
representative of U.S. hospitals in general. Second, the analysis is based on financial 
statement information from only four years, 2004 to 2007. Although these are the most 
recent years for which OSHPD financial data are available, it cannot be ruled out that the 
relationships found in this study are different during other time periods and thus not 




data from hospital financial statements. No internal data or indicators of the processes 
and effectiveness of hospital revenue cycle management have been used because of the 
limited availability of such data. Fourth, this analysis focuses on cross-sectional variation 
only and does not explore changes for individual hospitals over time. Additional 
correlation analysis of changes at the hospital level, however, confirmed the findings of 
the main analysis (see Appendix). Finally, as noted, the analyses performed in this study 
are purely descriptive, bivariate analyses of associations among various financial benefits 
of effective hospital revenue cycle management. Although Spearman’s rho correlation 
coefficients do not assume a linear relationship between variables, its limitations are 
otherwise similar to those of the more frequently used Pearson correlation coefficient. In 
particular, bivariate correlation analyses limit the inferences that can be drawn about the 
independent relationships between key variables. 
 These caveats notwithstanding, this article is among the first to offer an expanded 
set of outcomes against which to measure the effectiveness of revenue cycle 
management. It also provides an early indication that these outcomes are complementary, 







In order to address one of the main limitations of this study, the cross-sectional analyses 
are replicated using year-over-year changes as well as changes over the four-year study 
period at the hospital level. As expected, the results of this reanalysis are similar to those 
of the cross-sectional analyses (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). The correlations between year-over-
year changes in net patient revenue per adjusted discharge and in the contractual 
allowance percentage are small but consistently negative and statistically significant at 
the one percent confidence level. Similarly, the correlations between the year-over-year 
changes in net patient revenue per adjusted discharge and in the bad debt percentage are 
small but consistently negative. None of these, however, are statistically significant at 
conventional confidence levels. Finally, the correlations between the year-over-year 
changes in net patient revenue per adjusted discharge and in the charity care percentage 
are small and not significantly different from zero. For the four-year study period, the 
respective correlation coefficients are –0.08, 0.06, and –0.07 for the relationships 
between net patient revenue per adjusted discharge and contractual allowances, charity 





Table 2.4: Relationships among Year-over-Year and Four-Year Changes in 
Measures of the Amount of Patient Revenue 
  Net Patient Revenue per Adjusted Discharge 
      
 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2004–2007 
     
Contractual allowance –0.2183 –0.2008 –0.1379 –0.0757 
percentage (.0001) (.0002) (.0093) (.1698) 
     
Charity care percentage 0.0173 –0.0390 0.0507 0.0609 
 (.7770) (.5214) (.3915) (.3182) 
     
Bad debt percentage –0.0894 –0.0611 –0.0493 –0.0663 
 (.1133) (.2740) (.3680) (.2420) 
 
Notes: Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients and p values in parentheses. 
 
The correlation coefficients for the relationships among year-over-year changes in 
the measures of amount and speed of patient revenue collection mirror the results of the 
cross-sectional analysis (see Table 2.5). The correlations between year-over-year changes 
in net patient revenue per adjusted discharge and days in net accounts receivable are 
small but consistently negative confirming the earlier finding that hospitals that collect 
their revenues faster tend to collect more revenue. With regard to the three types of 
revenue deductions, the correlations between year-over-year changes in days in net 
accounts receivable and both the contractual allowance percentage and the charity care 
percentage are small but almost always positive. The correlations between days in net 







Table 2.5: Relationships among Year-over-Year and Four-Year Changes in 
Measures of the Amount and the Speed of Patient Revenue Collection 
  Days in Net Accounts Receivable 
     
 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2004–2007 
     
Net patient revenue per –0.0718 –0.1482 –0.0512 –0.1963 
adjusted discharge (.1890) (.0060) (.3343) (.0003) 
     
Contractual allowance 0.0921 0.1500 0.1127 0.0493 
percentage (.0831) (.0046) (.0311) (.3567) 
     
Charity care percentage –0.0373 –0.0117 –0.0170 –0.0734 
 (.5330) (.8451) (.7708) (.2202) 
     
Bad debt percentage 0.0550 0.0491 –0.0058 0.1191 
 (.3152) (.3692) (.9145) (.0303) 
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Chapter 3  
 
Hospital Revenue Cycle Management and Payer Mix: Do Government Payers 
Undermine Hospitals’ Ability to Generate and Collect Patient Care Revenue? 
 
Abstract 
In recent years, budget pressures combined with the acceleration in the growth of hospital 
costs have drawn policymakers’ attention to government payers of healthcare — in 
particular Medicare and Medicaid — and the ways in which these payers reimburse 
hospitals. Together, Medicare and Medicaid represent 55 percent of care provided by 
hospitals (American Hospital Association 2009a), yet little is known about how 
government payers affect hospitals’ revenue cycle management performance. Using 
hospital financial information from Medicare cost reports for 2002 to 2007 and audited 
financial statements for 2000 to 2006, this study analyzes the relationship between 
hospitals’ government payer mix, i.e., their proportions of Medicare and Medicaid 
patients, and their ability to generate and collect patient care revenue. Hospital-level fixed 
effects regression analysis finds that hospitals with higher Medicare payer mix collect 
somewhat more patient revenue while also collecting their revenue faster. Higher 
Medicaid payer mix, on the other hand, is associated with neither the amount nor the 
speed of patient revenue collection. To conclude, government payers do not appear to 
undermine hospitals’ ability to generate and collect patient care revenue. Despite 
increases in government payer mix, hospital managers are frequently able to generate 






In recent years, budget pressures combined with the acceleration in the growth of hospital 
costs have drawn policymakers’ attention to government payers of healthcare — in 
particular Medicare and Medicaid — and the ways in which these payers reimburse 
hospitals (American Hospital Association 2009a; Friedman et al. 2004). Medicare’s and 
Medicaid’s payment policies and practices affect both the volume of hospital care 
provided to publicly insured patients and its cost. As the proportion of health-related 
expenditures in the federal and many state budgets has increased, legislators have been 
forced to consider cuts to government payers’ reimbursement rates as a means to contain 
health care costs and balance their budgets. 
Medicare and Medicaid currently represent 55 percent of care provided by U.S. 
hospitals (American Hospital Association 2009a), yet little is known about how 
government payers affect hospitals’ revenue cycle management performance, in 
particular their ability to generate and collect patient services revenue. The passage of 
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 had a tremendous effect on hospitals (Berger 2008). The 
two programs were both expansive and expensive and enormously strengthened the 
financial position of hospitals (Starr 1982). The continued importance of government 
payers for hospitals’ financial viability became clear after the introduction of Medicare’s 
prospective payment system in 1983 and the passage of the Balanced Budget Act in 
1997. Both implemented severe cuts to hospital reimbursement, which substantially 
reduced hospitals’ patient revenues, suggesting that government payers’ reimbursement 






This study fills some of the gaps in the literature on hospital revenue cycle 
management and explores whether government payers undermine hospitals’ ability to 
generate and collect patient revenue. In particular, it analyzes the relationship between 
hospitals’ government payer mix, i.e., their proportions of Medicare and Medicaid 
patients, and the amount of patient revenue hospitals generate as well as the speed with 
which hospitals collect patient revenue. The findings of this study are not only of interest 
to hospital financial managers who aim to improve their management of the revenue 
cycle; the results can also inform federal and state policymakers as they consider the 
implications of potential changes to Medicare and Medicaid for the financial viability of 
hospitals and consequently access to hospital care for publicly insured patients.  
 
Background and literature review 
Empirical evidence on hospital revenue cycle management is rare and research on the 
relationship between hospital payer mix and revenue cycle management performance is 
virtually nonexistent. The overwhelming majority of publications are based on the 
insights and experiences of practitioners working in the field. As a result, most of the 
publications can be found in practitioners’ journals presenting anecdotal evidence of 
potentially important factors of effective revenue cycle management and offering 
suggestions for improvements at other hospitals based on the experiences gained at the 
authors' institutions.  
The empirical analysis of hospitals’ revenue cycle management performance is 
complicated by the fact that it is largely driven by factors internal to the hospital, such as 





recordkeeping and coding, and the training and experience of the hospital’s billing staff 
(for a detailed overview of the hospital revenue cycle, see Rauscher and Wheeler 2008). 
Since such internal information on hospitals’ revenue cycle management policies and 
practices is generally not publicly available, the few existing empirical studies have 
focused on external factors thought to impact revenue cycle management performance. 
All of these studies have included indicators of hospital payer mix in one form or another 
as a key explanatory variable. 
One of the earliest empirical studies of the relationship between payer mix and 
hospital revenue cycle management performance is a descriptive study by Prince and 
Ramanan (1992), which examines factors related to excess collection time. Excess 
collection time is measured as the difference between the actual collection time and the 
median collection time for one of six panels to which the hospital is assigned based on 
ownership and financial reporting practices. Using data for bond-issuing, not-for-profit 
hospitals for the years 1986 to 1988, the authors find that Medicare and Medicaid payer 
mix are negatively associated with excess collection time in three of the six panels, as is 
Blue Cross payer mix. Increases in Medicare, Medicaid, and Blue Cross payer mix are 
thus associated with decreases in hospitals’ average collection periods. 
In a study with a somewhat different focus, Rosko (2001) examines factors 
associated with hospitals’ provision of uncompensated care. Uncompensated care 
represents one of the determinants of the amount of patient revenue a hospital generates 
and is thus an important aspect of revenue cycle management performance. Using data 
for all Pennsylvania hospitals for 1995, the author finds that uncompensated care, 





associated with the area unemployment rate, a proxy for those without health insurance 
and one aspect of hospital payer mix. The relationship between the area unemployment 
rate and the provision of uncompensated care, however, is not statistically significant at 
conventional confidence levels indicating that there is no relationship between a 
hospital’s share of uninsured patients and its amount of patient revenue.  
Likewise, Buckley (2004) finds no relationship between payer mix and hospitals’ 
amount of patient revenue. As part of a study of the effects of payer mix on hospital nurse 
to patient ratios and hospital quality of care, the author explores the effect of payer mix 
on the amount of revenue hospitals collect per patient. Using an unbalanced panel of U.S. 
hospitals for the 1990s, the author finds small positive effects of Medicare and Medicaid 
payer mix on the amount of revenue per patient, none of which, however, is statistically 
significant at conventional confidence levels.  
 
Conceptual framework 
A hospital’s ability to generate and collect patient care revenue is determined by its payer 
mix, i.e., its relative proportions of Medicare, Medicaid, privately insured, and uninsured 
patients. Payment policies and practices vary substantially across third-party payers and 
can be more or less generous with respect to how much and how fast hospitals are 
reimbursed for the services they provide (Friedman et al. 2004; Ladewig and Hecht 1993; 
May 2004). 
The amount of patient revenue a hospital collects is a function of the prices the 





of a hospital’s payer mix has a pervasive influence on both. Payer mix largely determines 
the average net revenue a hospital is able to generate for any given service (Cleverley and 
Cameron 2007). Unlike firms in most other industries, which use billed charges as the 
only type of payment, an average hospital may have several hundred different contractual 
relationships with third-party payers, all of which specify different rates of 
reimbursement for any given service. While Medicare and Medicaid pay hospitals 
according to pre-determined payment schedules – most frequently in the form of fixed 
per-episode payments based on diagnosis related groups — private third-party payers 
negotiate reimbursement rates individually with each hospital. On average, because of 
their market power, Medicare and Medicaid pay hospitals a substantially lower 
percentage of billed charges than private insurers and uninsured patients resulting in 
payment shortfalls for hospitals (American Hospital Association 2009a; Melnick and 
Fonkych 2008). Unless hospitals are able to offset some of the underpayments from 
Medicare and Medicaid by negotiating higher prices from private health insurers and 
charging the uninsured more, hospitals with higher Medicare and Medicaid payer mix 
likely collect reduced amounts of patient revenue. 
A hospital’s payer mix, however, not only influences the average price hospitals 
achieve for each service but also their volume of services. Before a patient can be 
admitted to the hospital, many third-party payers require pre-authorization of services; 
once a patient has been admitted, payers frequently influence the number of services and 
the intensity of care provided through case management and utilization review. Some 
payers, such as managed care organizations, manage the volume of services provided to 





result, hospitals with higher shares of managed care patients, including Medicare patients 
enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans and Medicaid patients enrolled in health 
maintenance organizations, may experience reductions in their volume of services and 
thus collect lower amounts of patient revenue when compared to hospitals with more 
patients covered under fee-for-service health insurance plans. 
Equally importantly, but rarely discussed in the same context, a hospital’s payer 
mix also influences its speed of revenue collection. Hospitals’ average collection periods 
vary greatly by payer. While some third-party payers, such as Medicare and many 
managed care organizations, are bound by federal law or state prompt pay laws to 
reimburse providers within specified periods of time (Hammond 2002), other payers, 
such as private indemnity insurance companies, may take an inordinate amount of time to 
settle bills because of frequent disputes over coverage or reasonableness (Cleverley and 
Cameron 2007). Collections from indigent and self-pay patients often prove to be 
particularly difficult resulting in substantial payment delays (Solucient 2005). As a result, 
hospitals with higher shares of Medicare and managed care patients, including Medicaid 
patients in states where Medicaid is mainly administered through private health 
maintenance organizations, are often able to collect their patient revenue relatively fast 
while hospitals serving more patients with traditional fee-for-service insurance coverage 









Following previous empirical studies (Buckley 2004; Prince and Ramanan 1992; Rosko 
2001) and the conceptual framework outlined above, I model hospital revenue cycle 
management performance, i.e., hospitals’ ability to generate and collect patient revenue, 
as a function of payer mix and a set of control variables:  
 
Revenue cycle management performance, RCMit, is measured using three key financial 
performance indicators in terms of increases in the amounts and the speeds of patient 
revenue collection. The independent variables of interest are indicators of hospitals’ 
payer mix, PayerMixit, in particular their shares of government payers, Medicare and 
Medicaid. In addition, a set of hospital-level characteristics, year and state dummy 
variables, represented as Xit, are included in the model. The subscripts i and t refer to 
hospital i in year t.  
 Because of the potential for hospital-level variation in the way hospitals manage 
the revenue cycle, I include a hospital-specific error term, µi, which represents the 
unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals (Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Greene 2008). 
Revenue cycle management policies and practices have been found to vary substantially 
across hospitals. While some hospitals have a highly integrated, well managed revenue 
cycle encompassing every step from patient registration to the collection and posting of 
cash, other hospitals are characterized by a silo structure of managing the revenue cycle 
with little integration of the functions of different departments (Eldenburg, Schafer, and 





management policies and practices. In general, hospital-level heterogeneity can be 
modeled using either fixed or random effects. Hausman tests of the null hypothesis that 
the hospital-level effects are random indicated that fixed-effects regression was preferred 
over random effects. Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors are calculated to 
account for the clustering of observations within hospitals over time. 
 
Measures 
Revenue cycle management performance 
Hospital revenue cycle management performance, the dependent variable of interest in 
this study, is measured using three key financial indicators of hospitals’ ability to 
generate and collect patient revenue. Hospitals’ ability to generate patient revenue is 
measured using two measures of the amount of revenue, net patient revenue per adjusted 
discharge and net patient revenue per total assets. Hospitals’ ability to collect patient 
revenue is measured using one measure of the speed of revenue collection, days in net 
















Average wage index and case mix 
index adjusted net patient revenue 
per discharge where discharges are 
adjusted for the proportion of 
outpatient business of the hospital 
{[(Net patient revenue × 0.71 
÷ CMS wage index) + (Net 
patient revenue × 0.29)] ÷ 
Adjusted discharges} ÷ Case 
mix index 
 
Adjusted discharges = Total 
acute care discharges × (Gross 
patient revenue ÷ Gross 




Average case mix index adjusted net 
patient revenue per dollar invested in 
total assets 
(Net patient revenue ÷ Case 
mix index) ÷ Total assets 
Days in net 
accounts 
receivable 
Number of days required to collect 
on charges for care provided to 
patients 
(Net accounts receivable × 
365) ÷ Net patient revenue 
 
 
The most frequently used indicator of hospital revenue cycle management 
performance is days in net accounts receivable, or the average collection period, a 
measure of the speed of patient revenue collection (Berger 2008; Hammer 2005; May 
2004; Prince and Ramanan 1992; Quist and Robertson 2004; Solucient 2005). It is 
calculated as net accounts receivable times 365 days divided by net patient revenue and 
represents the number of days of net patient revenue that a hospital has due from patient 
billings after all revenue deductions. Unlike Prince and Ramanan (1992), I use days in net 
accounts receivable instead of excess collection time because the fixed-effects model I 
employ controls for hospital-level characteristics, such as ownership and financial 
reporting practices, which may affect hospitals’ speed of revenue collection and were 





Besides the speed of revenue collection, Rauscher and Wheeler (2008) have 
argued that an equally important indicator of revenue cycle management performance is a 
hospital’s ability to generate patient revenue measured in terms of the amount of patient 
revenue. Unlike Buckley (2004), who defines the amount of revenue as revenue per 
patient, this study uses net patient revenue per adjusted discharge and net patient revenue 
per total assets. Net patient revenue per adjusted discharge is defined as wage and case 
mix index adjusted net patient revenue per discharge, where discharges are adjusted by 
the ratio of gross patient revenue to gross inpatient revenue. Adjusting net patient 
revenues per discharge for differences in case mix complexity, prevailing wage rates, and 
outpatient volumes facilitates the comparison of the amount of patient revenue across 
different types of hospitals and hospitals in different geographic locations, which the 
measure used by Buckley (2004) does not guarantee.  
Net patient revenue per total assets is used as an alternative measure in those parts 
of the analysis where large numbers of missing data do not allow the calculation of net 
patient revenue per adjusted discharge without compromising sample size. Net patient 
revenue per total assets is defined as the ratio of case mix adjusted net patient revenue to 
a hospital’s total assets. Scaling net patient revenue by the case mix index of a facility 
adjusts for differences in case mix complexity across hospitals. Expressing net patient 
revenue as a percentage of total assets adjusts for the size of a facility and thus to some 
extent for the volume of patient care provided, including both inpatient and outpatient 
care. Unlike net patient revenue per adjusted discharge, net patient revenue per total 






Payer Mix Indicators  
The independent variables of interest in this study are indicators of hospitals’ government 
payer mix, i.e., their shares of Medicare and Medicaid patients. The reference group to 
which Medicare and Medicaid are compared consists of all private payers including 
commercial health insurers as well as uninsured and self-pay patients. In general, payer 
mix can be defined either in terms of revenues received from each payer or in terms of 
volume of services provided to patients covered by each payer, such as the number of 
admissions or patient days attributable to each payer. For the purpose of this study, three 
different measures of Medicare and Medicaid payer mix are employed in the analysis. 
Medicare and Medicaid payer mix are measured first in terms of revenues using gross 
patient services revenue and second in terms of volume using acute care admissions and 
acute care inpatient days (Table 3.2).  
Measuring Medicare and Medicaid payer mix in terms of revenues, admissions, 
and patient days produces somewhat different estimates of the composition of each 
hospital’s payer mix. Hospitals with large shares of Medicare patients likely boast high 
percentages on all three measures of payer mix. When measured in terms of acute care 
admissions, however, Medicare payer mix tends to understate the percentage of revenue 
that is derived from Medicare. This is due to the fact that Medicare patients have longer 
average lengths of stay allowing hospitals to generate more patient revenue (Solucient 
2005). Likewise, hospitals with large shares of Medicaid patients likely record high 
percentages on all three measures of payer mix. When measured in terms of acute care 
admissions, however, Medicaid payer mix tends to overstate the percentage of revenue 





Medicaid patients are generally lower than those for Medicare and privately insured 
patients. The admission of a Medicaid patient does thus not allow the hospital to generate 
above average amounts of patient revenue (Solucient 2005).  
Besides Medicare and Medicaid payer mix, I include one additional indicator of 
payer mix in parts of my analysis: the percentage of gross patient revenue derived from 
managed care payers. After government payers, managed health care organizations 
represent the next largest payer group for many hospitals (Berger 2008). The term 
managed care is a catch-all for a variety of health insurance plans that are designed to 
limit the cost of health care through a range of utilization management and cost 
containment techniques (Berger 2008). For the purpose of this study, managed care payer 
mix not only includes privately insured patients covered by managed care payers, such as 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and 
point-of-service (POS) plans, but also Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries who receive 
their benefits through a managed care organization, such as Medicare beneficiaries 
enrolled in Medicare Advantage and certain Medicaid beneficiaries in states where 















Percentage of gross patient service 
revenue received from Medicare 
(Medicare gross patient 
service revenue ÷ Gross 




Total Medicare acute care admissions 
divided by the total number of acute 
care patients admitted to a hospital, 
expressed as a percentage 
(Medicare acute care 
admissions ÷ Total acute 
care admissions) × 100% 
Medicare acute 
care days 
Total number of Medicare acute care 
inpatient days at a hospital divided by 
the total number of acute care inpatient 
days at the hospital, expressed as a 
percentage 
(Medicare acute care 
inpatient days ÷ Total acute 
care inpatient days) × 100% 




Percentage of gross patient service 
revenue received from Medicaid 
(Medicaid gross patient 
service revenue ÷ Gross 




Total Medicaid acute care admissions 
divided by the total number of acute 
care patients admitted to a hospital, 
expressed as a percentage 
(Medicaid acute care 
admissions ÷ Total acute 
care admissions) × 100% 
Medicaid acute 
care days 
Total number of Medicaid acute care 
inpatient days at a hospital divided by 
the total number of acute care inpatient 
days at the hospital, expressed as a 
percentage 
(Medicaid acute care 
inpatient days ÷ Total acute 
care inpatient days) × 100% 




Percentage of gross patient service 
revenue received for patients insured 
in managed care health plans 
(Gross patient service 
revenue from managed care 
payers ÷ Gross patient 








Control variables  
Besides payer mix, a number of factors, both internal and external to the hospital, have 
been found to affect revenue cycle management performance (Buckley 2004; Prince and 
Ramanan 1992; Rosko 2001). One major limitation of the fixed effects regression model 
used in this study, however, is that coefficients on time-invariant covariates cannot be 
estimated but are absorbed in the individual-level constant term. Lack of identification is 
the price of the robustness of the specification to unmeasured correlation between the 
common effects and the exogenous variables (Greene 2008). For the purpose of this 
study, lack of identification is a minor issue since I am primarily interested in the 
relationship between payer mix, a time-variant variable, and revenue cycle management 
outcomes. Lack of identification, however, limits the number of control variables that can 
be included in the analysis (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3: Measures of Control Variables 
Variable Definition/Formula 
Case mix index Average diagnosis-related group (DRG) case weight for all of a 
hospital’s Medicare patients using the Medicare DRG patient 
classification system 
Average age of 
plant 
Accumulated depreciation ÷ Depreciation expense 
 
Year  Binary variable for each calendar year in the study 
State trends State × Year 
 State is a binary variable for each of the 50 U.S. states 
 Year is an ordinary variable whereby the first calendar year in 







Case mix index is the average diagnosis-related group (DRG) case weight for all 
of a hospital's Medicare volume. Although it is specifically relevant to the Medicare 
patients at a given hospital, it is frequently considered a reasonable surrogate of the case 
mix complexity of all of a hospital’s patients (Solucient 2005). Since case mix index is 
controlled for in both measures of the amount of patient revenue it is only included in the 
analysis of the speed of revenue collection. A higher case mix index may translate into 
payment delays for hospitals. More complex cases often prompt additional reviews by 
third-party payers in the processing of claims, which may result in hospitals having to 
wait longer before receiving payment. Prince and Ramanan (1992) included case mix 
index as an explanatory variable in their study of hospitals’ collection performance. They 
found that case mix index was significantly negatively related to excess collection time in 
two out of six subgroups of hospitals analyzed providing empirical evidence that at least 
certain types of hospitals experience review delays in payment.  
Average age of plant is calculated as accumulated depreciation on all of a 
hospital’s buildings, fixtures, and major movable equipment divided by the depreciation 
expense of the period. It indicates the average accounting age in years of a hospital’s 
capital assets. Average age of plant is only included as a control variable in the analysis 
of the amount of patient revenue measured in terms of net patient revenue per total assets. 
Hospitals may record higher net patient revenues per total assets because of more 
effective revenue cycle management. Hospitals may, however, also record higher net 
patient revenues per total assets because of changes in their asset base, such as changes in 
the book values of its property, plant, and equipment, which may be the result of an aging 





Finally, year and state dummy variables are included in the analysis. An indicator 
for the calendar year of the observation is included as a control variable to capture 
intertemporal changes in revenue cycle management performance common to all 
hospitals in the sample. Moreover, following Prince and Ramanan (1992) who found that 
the collection performance of hospitals varied by state, an indicator for the state in which 
each hospital operates is included as a control variable. However, since I use a fixed-
effects regression model, simple state dummy variables cannot be included in the 
analysis. Instead, I include state trends, which are defined as interaction terms of state 
and year. The variable state consists of a binary variable for each of the 50 U.S. states. 
The variable year represents an ordinary variable whereby the first calendar year in the 
study is coded as 1, the second calendar year is coded as 2, and so on. State trends 
capture changes in revenue cycle management performance over time that are common to 
all hospitals in a state, such as changes in the reimbursement policies of a state’s 
Medicaid program or changes in state-level insurance regulations affecting private health 
insurers including the passage of so-called prompt pay laws that require payers to pay 







Data and sample 
Description of the data sources 
A significant challenge to an analysis of the relationship between payer mix and revenue 
cycle management performance is the adequacy of the hospital financial data available. 
Hospitals’ audited financial statements — the gold standard in hospital financial 
reporting — are not publicly available in many states and there is no national database of 
audited financial accounting information for not-for-profit U.S. hospitals (Kane and 
Magnus 2001). Health services researchers have thus come to rely upon five main data 
sources to analyze hospitals’ financial status and performance: audited financial reports 
for subsets of U.S. hospitals, state hospital financial and statistical reports, Medicare Cost 
Reports, the American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey, and Internal Revenue 
Service data (Needleman 2003). These data sources vary substantially in the accuracy 
and reliability of the financial information provided, the level of detail reported, and the 
representativeness of the hospitals included. With the exception of audited financial 
statements and some state hospital financial and statistical reports, all available data 
sources are unaudited and have been reported to contain many errors and inconsistencies 
(Burkhardt 1995; Kane and Magnus 2001; Magnus and Smith 2000; Needleman 2003). 
The limited availability of audited financial statements for not-for-profit hospitals, on the 
other hand, means that information from these reports generally does not allow 
researchers to draw conclusions that are representative for all not-for-profit U.S. 
hospitals.  
This paper tries to overcome some of the existing data limitations by separately 





First, I analyze financial data from the Medicare Cost Report collected and provided by 
Thomson Reuters.
1
 Since almost all U.S. hospitals have a contract with Medicare to treat 
Medicare beneficiaries, the Thomson Reuters dataset represents close to the total 
population of U.S. hospitals. Second, I analyze audited hospital financial statement 
information for all bond-issuing, not-for-profit U.S. hospitals collected and provided by 
Merritt Research Services.
2
 Analyzing both datasets allows me to compare and reinforce 
my results and generalize them to a larger subset of hospitals than the sole use of either 
one of the two datasets. Moreover, it allows me to use several different measures of both 
payer mix and revenue cycle management performance and thus determine the robustness 
of my results with respect to different specifications of the dependent and independent 
variables analyzed. 
 
Thomson Reuters data 
The data provided by Thomson Reuters contain financial data from the Medicare Cost 
Report for all hospitals that treated Medicare patients between 2002 and 2007. Of the 
7,072 hospitals and 32,347 hospital year observations included in the dataset, I obtain 
financial information on 4,264 hospitals and 20,655 hospital year observations, which 
have complete data on the variables of interest. The final panel represents 60.3 percent of 
hospitals and 63.9 percent of hospital years in the database. 
                                                 
1
 Data for this publication were supplied by Thomson Reuters. Any analysis, interpretation, or conclusion 
based on these data is solely that of the authors, and Thomson Reuters disclaims responsibility for any such 
analysis, interpretation or conclusion. 
2
 Audited financial statement information for bond-issuing, not-for-profit hospitals was supplied by Merritt 
Research Services, LLC of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The software to construct the dataset used in this research 






Merritt Research Services data 
The Merritt Research Services database contains audited financial statement information 
beginning in 1988 for all not-for-profit hospitals that have issued tax-exempt debt. The 
period of analysis is limited to 2000 to 2006. Of the 1,486 hospitals for which financial 
reports are available, I obtain financial information on 753 hospitals with complete data 
on the variables of interest. The final panel contains 2,761 hospital year observations, 
representing 50.7 percent of hospitals and 31.7 percent of hospital years in the database. 
 
Derivation of the samples 
Since data from two different sources is used in this study, the sample derivation process 
is applied twice. As described in detail below, both data sets have substantial missing 
data problems, which result in the final samples comprising only between 32 and 64 
percent of all available hospital year observations. The nature of the missing data 
problems varies by data source. Thomson Reuters data is based on information from 
hospitals’ Medicare Cost Reports and thus on unaudited financial statements, which are 
known to contain many errors (Kane and Magnus 2001). First, negative values are 
reported for several variables where it is impossible to have negative values. Neither 
assets nor liabilities should ever have negative values reported. Observations with 
negative values for assets and liabilities of interest for this study are consequently 
dropped from the sample. Moreover, implausibly large values are reported for several 





data, on the other hand, represents financial statement information from audited financial 
statements. As a result, there are only very few missing or implausible values for most 
financial statement data elements. However, there is a substantial amount of missing 
information on hospitals’ payer mix since hospitals are not obligated to provide 
information regarding payer mix in the notes to their financial statements. Observations 
with missing payer mix information are dropped from the sample. 
 
Thomson Reuters data 
The following steps were taken to derive the final sample of 4,264 hospitals and 20,655 
hospital year observations (Table 3.4): 1,320 hospital year observations were excluded 
because of implausible values for days in net accounts receivable. Of these, 448 hospital 
year observations were excluded because of negative values and 872 hospital year 
observations were excluded because of extremely large values for days in net accounts 
receivable, defined as values that exceeded median days in net accounts receivable of 
55.69 by twice the standard deviation of 91.27, or values greater than 238.23 days. 
Moreover, 10,310 hospital year observations were excluded due to extremely large values 
for net patient revenue per adjusted discharge, defined as values that exceeded median net 
patient revenues per adjusted discharge of $5,324.05 by twice the standard deviation of 
$137,410.80, or values greater than $280,145.65. Finally, one hospital year observation 
was excluded due to an implausible value for the percentage of Medicare acute care 
inpatient days, reported as 100.9 percent, and 61 observations were dropped due to 





Merritt Research Services data 
The following steps were taken to derive the final sample of 753 hospitals and 2,761 
hospital year observations (Table 3.4): First, 49 hospital year observations were excluded 
because of missing values for days in net accounts receivable. Moreover, 4,181 hospital 
year observations were excluded due to missing values for Medicare payer mix, 71 
hospital year observations were excluded due to missing values for Medicaid payer mix, 
and 1,602 hospital year observations were excluded due to missing values for managed 
care payer mix. Finally, 38 hospital year observations were excluded because of missing 
information on the hospital’s case mix index and 13 observations were excluded due to 
missing values for average age of plant. 
 







Number of hospital year observations in the initial 
data set 
32,347 8,707 
Observations excluded due to missing or implausible 
values for: 
  
   Days in net accounts receivable 1,320 49 
   Net patient revenue per adjusted discharge 10,310 N/A 
   Net patient revenue per total assets N/A 41 
   Medicare payer mix 1 4,181 
   Medicaid payer mix 61 71 
   Managed care payer mix N/A 1,602 
   Case mix index 0 38 
   Average age of plant N/A 13 
Number of hospital year observations in the final 












The missing data problems encountered in both data sets raise the question in how 
far the final samples are representative of all hospitals in each data set. For this purpose, a 
set of organizational and financial characteristics of hospitals in the final samples is 
compared to those of all hospitals (Table 3.5). When compared to all hospitals in the 
Thomson Reuters data set, the final sample differs substantially on a number of 
organizational and financial indicators. Hospitals with complete data are generally larger, 
better performing, and not-for-profit hospitals. These findings are consistent with the 
observation by Burkhardt (1995) who found that hospitals with missing Medicare Cost 
Report data are generally smaller, poorer performing, and investor-owned hospitals. The 
hospitals in the final sample are also more likely to be teaching hospitals, which tend to 
serve more publicly insured and uninsured patients, and thus report higher ratios of 
revenue deductions to gross patient revenues.  
Likewise, the final sample of Merritt hospitals differs from all hospitals in the 
Merritt Research Services database. While the hospitals with complete data are very 
similar in size and type of hospital to the hospitals with incomplete data, the two groups 
differ with respect to their operating and financial performance. Hospitals with complete 
data treat patients of somewhat higher case mix complexity and have higher occupancy 
rates. They also perform better financially — despite higher revenue deductions both 
their operating profit margin and their total profit margin are higher than those of 







Table 3.5: Representativeness of the Final Samples 
 Thomson Reuters 
Hospitals 










Hospital year observations included 20,655 32,347 2,761 8,707 
Time period covered 2002 – 2007 2000 – 2006 
Size 
Number of hospital beds 175.8** 135.4 449 441 
Gross patient revenues (in 000) N/A N/A 488,190 466,491 
Net patient revenues (in 000) 133,000** 95,900 304,222* 342,446 
Hospital ownership and type 
Not-for-profit hospitals 61%** 54% N/A N/A 
Investor-owned hospitals 20%** 24% N/A N/A 
Government-owned hospitals 19%** 23% N/A N/A 
System affiliated hospitals N/A N/A 22% 22% 
Teaching hospitals 31%** 23% 19% 18% 
Operating performance 
Case mix index 1.32 1.32 1.33** 1.31 
Occupancy rate 52%** 50% 63%** 62% 
Average length of stay 4.1** 8.7 4.8 4.9 
Financial performance 
Revenue deductions as a percentage 
of gross patient revenue 
54%** 50% 50%** 48% 
Operating profit margin 3.3 3.4 0.6* 0.4 
Total profit margin 3.4 3.5 3.7** 3.4 
 
Notes: Sample means are presented for all variables. Actual sample sizes for both final sample and all 
hospitals that were used in the calculations may be lower than the number of hospital year observations 
because of missing or implausible data elements that were excluded for the comparisons and t-tests 
reported above. * denotes difference in means between the final sample and all hospitals is statistically 
significant at the five percent confidence level. ** denotes difference in means between the final sample 









To answer my research question, I estimate six different models of revenue cycle 
management performance, all of which represent variations of the general model 
described above (Table 3.6). First, I analyze the speed of revenue collection, the most 
frequently used measure of revenue cycle management performance, using days in net 
accounts receivable. I estimate three different versions of the above model. Models 1 and 
2 employ Thomson Reuters hospital data. Model 1 defines Medicare and Medicaid payer 
mix, the main independent variables, in terms of acute care admissions. Model 2 defines 
Medicare and Medicaid payer mix in terms of acute care days. Model 3 uses hospital 
financial information from Merritt Research Services and defines Medicare and Medicaid 
payer mix in terms of gross patient services revenue received from these payers. It also 
includes managed care payer mix measured in terms of gross patient services revenue 
received from managed care payers as an additional control. 
Second, I analyze the amount of patient revenue, again by estimating three 
different versions of my general model. Models 4 and 5 employ Thomson Reuters data 
and analyze net patient revenue per adjusted discharge as a function of payer mix. Model 
4 defines Medicare and Medicaid payer mix in terms of acute care admissions while 
Model 5 defines Medicare and Medicaid payer mix in terms of acute care days. Model 6 
employs financial information for Merritt Research Services hospitals and analyzes net 
patient revenue per total assets as a function of Medicare and Medicaid payer mix, 







Table 3.6: Overview of Model Specifications 
Model Data set used Dependent variable analyzed 
Medicare and Medicaid payer 
mix measured in terms of 
Additional payer mix 
indicators included 
1 Thomson 
Reuters Days in net accounts receivable 
Acute care admissions None  
2 Acute care days None  
3 Merritt Gross patient service revenue Managed care payer mix 
4 Thomson 
Reuters 
Net patient revenue per adjusted 
discharge 
Acute care admissions  None 
5 Acute care days  None 







Thomson Reuters hospitals 
Revenue cycle management performance 
On average, Thomson Reuters hospitals reported 57.2 days in net accounts receivable 
(Table 3.7). Between 2002 and 2007, the average collection period of the sample 
hospitals decreased by around seven days, from 61.5 days in 2002 to 54.4 days in 2007. 
Average collection periods varied substantially across hospitals, as indicated by the 
sample between group standard deviation of almost 21 days, but varied less within 
hospitals, as evidenced by the within group standard deviation of 12.3. Average net 
patient revenue per adjusted discharge equaled $5,806. As expected, average net patient 
revenue per adjusted discharge for the sample hospitals increased steadily over time, 
from $5,462 in 2002 to $6,321 in 2007. Like average collection periods, average net 
patient revenue per adjusted discharge varied considerably across hospitals but less 
within hospitals. 
 
Payer mix indicators and control variables 
Between 2002 and 2007, the percentages of acute care admissions and acute care 
inpatient days attributable to Medicare patients equaled 41.8 percent and 50.4 percent, 
respectively (Table 3.7). The difference of almost nine percentage point between these 
two measures can be explained by the fact that, once admitted, Medicare patients on 
average stay in the hospital longer than non-Medicare patients, mainly due to greater 





acute care admissions and acute care inpatient days equaled 15.3 percent and 12.6 
percent, respectively. Unlike Medicare patients, most Medicaid patients stay in the 
hospital for a shorter period of time. As a result, Medicaid patients’ share of inpatient 
days is smaller than their share of inpatient admissions. As expected, there was 
substantial variation in payer mix across hospitals while the changes in payer mix within 
hospitals over time were small. Payer mix is determined to a large extent by the 
socioeconomic environment that the hospital operates in and hospital managers may not 
be able to substantially change its composition. The average case mix index reported by 
the hospitals in the final sample was 1.32. Like payer mix, hospitals’ case mix index 
varied substantially across hospitals but much less within hospitals over time. 
 
Merritt Research Services hospitals  
Revenue cycle management performance 
On average, Merritt hospitals reported 59.7 days in net accounts receivable (Table 3.7). 
Between 2000 and 2006, days in net accounts receivable decreased by over 15 days, from 
68.7 days in 2000 to 53.6 days in 2006. As expected, average collection periods varied 
considerably across hospitals as shown by the sample between group standard deviation 
of 15.4 days. Average collection periods varied less within hospitals as evidenced by the 
within group standard deviation of 9.4 days. Average case mix adjusted net patient 
revenue per total assets equaled 0.65, i.e., hospitals collected an average of 65 cents in 
case mix adjusted net patient revenues for each dollar invested in assets. Average case 
mix adjusted net patient revenue per total assets, however, varied substantially over time. 





increased to 0.66 in 2006. Like average collection periods, average net patient revenue 
per total assets varied considerably across hospitals but less within hospitals. 
 
Payer mix indicators and control variables 
Between 2000 and 2006, the percentages of gross patient service revenues received from 
Medicare and Medicaid equaled 40.1 and 11.9, respectively (Table 3.7). While changes 
in hospitals’ payer mix over time were small, there was substantial variation across 
hospitals: Medicare payer mix ranged from zero percent to 86 percent and Medicaid 
payer mix ranged from zero percent to 68 percent. Moreover, the average percentage of 
gross patient service revenue received from managed care payers was 27.8 percent. 
Again, changes in hospitals’ managed care payer mix over time were small but 
considerable variation existed across hospitals: Managed care payer mix ranged from 
zero percent of gross patient service revenues to 97 percent. The average case mix index 








Table 3.7: Descriptive Results 















Revenue cycle management performance 
Days in net accounts receivable 57.16 
(22.22) 
20.66 12.29  59.74 
(17.50) 
15.35 9.43 




8,066.98 1,317.52  N/A N/A N/A 
Net patient revenue per total 
assets 
N/A N/A N/A  0.65 
(0.27) 
0.25 0.076 
Payer mix indicators 
Medicare gross patient service 
revenue 
N/A N/A N/A  40.13 
(11.93) 
11.58 2.15 
Medicare acute care admissions 41.77 
(14.21) 
14.73 3.81  N/A N/A N/A 
Medicare acute care days 50.42 
(14.91) 
15.37 3.49  N/A N/A N/A 
Medicaid gross patient service 
revenue 
N/A N/A N/A  11.85 
(9.45) 
9.10 1.66 
Medicaid acute care admissions 15.29 
(11.46) 
10.90 4.17  N/A N/A N/A 
Medicaid acute care days 12.64 
(9.88) 
9.64 3.30  N/A N/A N/A 
Managed care gross patient 
service revenue 




Case mix index 1.32 
(0.28) 
0.29 0.045  1.33 
(0.27) 
0.27 0.046 







Hospital-level fixed effects regression results  
Speed of revenue collection 
Higher Medicare payer mix reduces hospitals’ days in net accounts receivable, whereas 
higher Medicaid payer mix is not associated with changes in the average collection 
period (Table 3.8). All three hospital-level fixed effects regression models find negative 
coefficients on Medicare payer mix. An increase in Medicare payer mix of one 
percentage point is thus associated with a decrease in hospitals’ average collection period 
by 0.08 to 0.14 days. Compared to private payers, Medicare pays hospitals faster. 
Medicaid, on the other hand, does not reimburse hospitals significantly faster than private 
payers. None of the three models finds any statistically significant relationship between 
Medicaid payer mix and days in net accounts receivable. Moreover, higher shares of 
managed care patients are associated with reductions in hospitals’ average collection 
periods. Model 3, which is the only model that allows for the inclusion of managed care 
payer mix as a covariate, finds that a one percentage point increase in managed care 
payer mix is associated with a statistically significant decrease in hospitals’ average 







Table 3.8: Regression Analysis of Days in Net Accounts Receivable with Hospital-
Level Fixed Effects 







    













Managed care payers — — –.126* 
(.053) 
    
Control variables    






    
Year dummies 5 included 5 included 6 included 
State trends 50 included 50 included 48 included 
Hospital fixed effects 4,264 included 4,264 included 752 included 
Adjusted R
2
 .016 .014 .056 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors are in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 5 
percent confidence level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Model 1 uses 
Thomson Reuters data and defines payer mix in terms of acute acre admissions. Model 2 uses Thomson 
Reuters data and defines payer mix in terms of acute care inpatient days. There were 4,264 hospitals and 
20,655 hospital year observations in Models 1 and 2. Model 3 uses Merritt Research Services data and 
defines payer mix in terms of gross patient services revenue. There were 752 hospitals and 2,755 hospital 








Amount of patient revenue 
Higher Medicare payer mix somewhat increases hospitals’ net patient revenues whereas 
higher Medicaid payer mix is not associated with the average amount of patient revenue 
hospitals collect (Table 3.9). Two of the three hospital-level fixed effects regression 
models find positive coefficients on Medicare payer mix. When the amount of patient 
revenue is measured in terms of net patient revenue per adjusted discharge (as in Models 
4 and 5), an increase in Medicare payer mix of one percentage point increases net patient 
revenue by between $21 and $80 per adjusted discharge. While statistically significant, 
these coefficients translate into relatively small increases of net patient revenue per 
adjusted discharge of between 0.3 and 1.4 percentage points. When the amount of patient 
revenue is measured in terms of net patient revenue per total assets (as in Model 6), 
however, higher Medicare payer mix is not associated with a statistically significant 
increase of the amount of patient revenue hospitals record.  
The numerical difference between the coefficients in Models 4 and 5 can be 
explained by the fact that admissions, when used as a measure of Medicare payer mix, 
tend to underestimate both the percentage of patient days attributable to Medicare 
patients and the percentage of patient revenues derived from Medicare (Solucient 2005). 
Medicare patients tend to stay in the hospital longer and use more resources than most 
non-elderly patients. An increase in Medicare acute care admissions (Model 4) is thus 
associated with larger changes in the amount of patient revenues collected than an 
increase in Medicare acute care inpatient days (Model 5) or an increase in gross patient 





The findings for Medicaid payer mix, on the other hand, are less clear. When 
measured in terms of acute care admissions (as in Model 4), an increase in Medicaid 
payer mix of one percentage point is associated with a statistically significant increase in 
net patient revenue of $7 per adjusted discharge. Likewise, when measured in terms of 
gross patient service revenue (as in Model 6), an increase in Medicaid payer mix is 
associated with a statistically significant increase in case mix adjusted net patient revenue 
per total assets of 0.003. Model 5, however, find no statistically significant relationships 
between higher Medicaid payer mix and net patient revenues.  
Besides Medicaid payer mix, the only other statistically significant coefficient in 
Model 6 is the coefficient on average age of plant. An increase in the average age of plant 
by one year is associated with an increase in net patient revenue per total assets of 0.01. 
Given that a hospital’s total assets are composed to a large extent of its property, plant, 
and equipment and thus depend on the average age of the property, plant, and equipment, 







Table 3.9: Regression Analysis of Net Patient Revenue per Adjusted Discharge 
(Models 4 and 5) and Net Patient Revenue per Total Assets (Model 6) with Hospital-
Level Fixed Effects 







    
Payer mix variables    












Managed care payers — — –.00045 
(.00043) 
    
Control variables    






    
Year dummies 5 included 5 included 5 included 
State trends 50 included 50 included 48 included 
Hospital fixed effects 4,264 included 4,264 included 753 included 
Adjusted R
2
 .0015 .0004 .10 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors are in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 5 
percent confidence level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Model 4 uses 
Thomson Reuters data and defines payer mix in terms of acute acre admissions. Model 5 uses Thomson 
Reuters data and defines payer mix in terms of acute care inpatient days. There were 4,264 hospitals and 
20,655 hospital year observations in Models 4 and 5. Model 6 uses Merritt Research Services data and 
defines payer mix in terms of gross patient services revenue. There were 753 hospitals and 2,756 hospital 
year observations in Model 6. (a) Average age of plant is not included as a control variable because the 








Together, Medicare and Medicaid represent 55 percent of care provided by U.S. hospitals 
(American Hospital Association 2009a), yet little is known about how government payers 
affect hospitals’ revenue cycle management performance, in particular their ability to 
generate and collect patient care revenue. I find that hospitals with a higher Medicare 
payer mix collect slightly higher average amounts of patient revenue while also collecting 
their patient revenue faster. Higher Medicaid payer mix, on the other hand, is associated 
with neither the amount nor the speed of patient revenue collection.  
Hospitals with larger shares of Medicare patients report shorter average collection 
periods than hospitals with more privately insured and uninsured patients. This result is 
consistent with prior empirical evidence by Prince and Ramanan (1992) who also found 
that higher Medicare payer mix was associated with lower average collection times. 
Based on the speed of payment, Medicare is a good payer. By law, Medicare is required 
to pay hospitals within three to four weeks after a clean bill has been submitted 
electronically (Hobbs 2007; Newitt and Robertson 2007). Most private third-party payers 
and self-pay patients, on the other hand, take more time than Medicare to settle bills and 
pay hospitals. Private indemnity insurers in particular frequently delay payment because 
of disputes over coverage or reasonableness (Cleverley and Cameron 2007). The one 
exception are managed care payers, which tend to pay hospitals faster than other private 
payers. The more managed care contracts a hospital enters into, the more sophisticated 
the hospital has to be when negotiating, billing, and collecting patient revenues, all of 





Medicaid, on the other hand, does not appear to pay hospitals faster, on average, 
than most private health insurers. This result is not consistent with Prince and Ramanan 
(1992) who found that  at least during the late 1980s  higher Medicaid payer mix 
was associated with lower average collection times. One likely explanation for the 
differences in findings is that Medicaid represents a program operated and financed 
jointly by the federal government and the states. As a result, there exist 56 different 
Medicaid programs across the country whose payment policies and practices differ 
widely. While almost all states have enacted prompt pay laws, the average time payers 
may take to reimburse health care providers ranges from 15 to 45 days (Hammond 2002). 
Currently, some Medicaid programs pay hospitals as quickly as within 14 days, whereas 
others take up to three or four months to reimburse hospitals (Hobbs 2007). Given that 
the samples of hospitals analyzed in this study cover the years 2000 to 2007, the findings 
may reflect changes in Medicaid’s average speed of reimbursement between the late 
1980s and the early 2000s or, alternatively, point to a non-representative selection of 
hospitals and, potentially, states. Future work should look more closely at state-level 
differences in Medicaid’s hospital reimbursement practices to determine whether 
increases in Medicaid payer mix add to hospitals’ average collection times in states 
known for their slow Medicaid reimbursement while contributing to shorter average 
collection periods in states known for faster Medicaid reimbursement. 
With respect to the amount of patient revenue, hospitals serving more publicly 
insured patients do not collect substantially more or less revenue than hospitals with more 
privately insured and uninsured patients. An increase in a hospital’s government payer 





increases in the average amount of patient revenue the hospital records. This finding is 
consistent with prior empirical evidence by Buckley (2004) who also found small 
positive effects of both higher Medicare and Medicaid payer mix on the amount of 
patient revenue. Despite frequently voiced concerns about government payers’ 
reimbursement rates (American Hospital Association 2009a), Medicare in particular 
appears to be a mid-range payer. Since their implementation in 1965, both Medicare and 
Medicaid have enormously strengthened the financial position of hospitals and as a result 
transformed the provision of hospital services into a profitable business. Despite 
substantial changes in reimbursement rates and terms during the past 25 years, such as 
the introduction of Medicare’s prospective payment system in 1983 or the passage of the 
Balanced Budget Act in 1997, government payers continue to play an important role in 
hospitals’ financial viability. Hospital managers’ complaints about low reimbursement 
rates by government payers, in particular by Medicare, may thus be somewhat overstated. 
Several other factors may, however, explain why hospitals serving more publicly 
insured patients do not necessarily collect reduced average amounts of patient revenue. 
First, when negotiating payment rates and terms, private third-party payers have 
historically taken into account the proportion of a hospital’s Medicare and Medicaid 
patients and the payment rates for these patients. Private payers often consider the 
hospital a social enterprise in need of financial support to assure access to adequate care 
for their insured. Particularly since the introduction of Medicare’s prospective payment 
system in 1983, which substantially reduced payment rates to hospitals, private third-
party payers have been concerned about hospitals’ financial viability. In Michigan, for 





revenue deductions hospitals incur —including contractual allowances granted to 
Medicare and Medicaid and bad debts from patients without health insurance. As a result, 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, like many other private payers across the country, 
has often agreed to pay hospitals more than what is necessary to cover their cost. More 
recently, however, major purchasers of healthcare, such as the auto industry in Michigan, 
have raised concerns about the financial burden they incur when compensating hospitals 
for public payers’ underpayments. While private payers’ concerns about the financial 
viability of hospitals have for a long time been an important factor in the negotiation 
process, they likely constitute a less important explanation for why government payers do 
not appear to undermine hospitals’ ability to generate adequate patient revenues in 
today’s business environment. 
In the current business environment, providers, i.e., hospitals themselves, have 
taken action to improve their revenue collections by initiating a variety of organizational 
and managerial changes. First, more effective revenue cycle management has enabled 
many hospitals to maintain their amounts of revenue per patient even as their payer mix 
has changed. Improvements in revenue cycle management that have been found to have 
positive effects on the amount of revenue include changes at the front end of the revenue 
cycle, such as requiring patients to pay upfront for the deductibles and co-payments they 
owe (Martinez 2008) and collecting information regarding any supplementary health 
insurance patients may have and that hospitals could bill for some of the care provided. 
At the back end of the revenue cycle, improved billing processes help increase the 
number of clean bills sent to government payers and their intermediaries and thus reduce 





Second, cost shifting has allowed certain hospitals — in particular hospitals 
located in socioeconomically advantaged areas — to offset changes in payer mix. While 
increases in hospitals’ shares of publicly insured patients may reduce patient revenue in 
the short-term, hospitals often look to the privately insured to make up the difference and 
remain financially viable in the long run. There is some empirical evidence that hospitals 
have traditionally been able to shift costs to private payers in order to counterbalance 
lower reimbursement rates by government payers. A study conducted by RAND, for 
instance, found that growing Medicare and Medicaid payment shortfalls accounted for 12 
percent of the increase in rates paid to California hospitals by private insurers in the late 
1990s (Zwanziger and Bamezai 2006). Likewise, Wu (2009) found that hospitals were 
able to transfer up 37 percent of the cuts in Medicare reimbursement rates implemented 
by the Balanced Budget Act in 1997 to private payers. In the early 2000s, coinciding with 
the managed care backlash and hospitals gaining market power, hospitals’ payment-to-
cost ratios for private payers continued to increase, from around 110 percent in 2000 to 
around 130 percent in 2007 (American Hospital Association 2009b), providing additional 
evidence that hospitals may be able to maintain average amounts of patient revenue by 
increasing their charge-to-cost ratios and charging the privately insured and the uninsured 
more (Melnick and Fonkych 2008). 
Third, in order to offset revenue decreases associated with changes in payer mix, 
hospitals may decide to change their service mix (American Hospital Association 2009a, 
Berger 2008). Hospitals may reduce the provision of services that do not generate enough 
revenue to cover the costs associated with them even though these services may be the 





same time, hospitals may introduce new, more profitable services that do not necessarily 
address the greatest needs in the community. A recent example that received national 
attention was the announcement of the University of Chicago Medical Center in March of 
2009 to reduce the number of inpatient beds available to emergency patients and to 
expand efforts to redirect to other hospitals and clinics those ER patients who do not need 
emergency care. The hospital, which serves a high percentage of Medicaid patients who 
often rely on care in the emergency room for non-emergent conditions, admitted that the 
changes were proposed to meet the hospital’s financial challenges (Louden 2009). 
 
Study limitations and future work 
Non-random samples of U.S. hospitals 
The hospitals analyzed in this study represent non-random samples of U.S. hospitals, 
which limits the generalizability of the findings. As discussed in detail in the section on 
data and sample selection, the final sample of Merritt Research Services hospitals 
includes only bond-issuing, not-for-profit U.S. hospitals. These hospitals are larger and 
better performing than the average U.S. hospital — they have higher occupancy rates, 
lower average lengths of stay, greater cash reserves, and stronger operating and total 
profit margins. Likewise, the final sample of Thomson Reuters hospitals does not 
represent a random sample of U.S. hospitals but includes disproportionately many larger, 
better performing, and not-for-profit hospitals. Given that I obtained similar results when 
separately analyzing both datasets, the findings of this study are likely generalizable to 





apply to smaller, poorer performing hospitals and caution should thus be exercised when 
interpreting and generalizing the findings.  
 
Revenue cycle management remains a black box 
Using fixed effects, this study controls for hospital-level time-invariant factors that may 
mitigate the relationship between payer mix and revenue cycle management performance 
but revenue cycle management itself remains a black box. Because of data limitations, 
this study does not allow me to determine which elements of the revenue cycle hospital 
managers focus on when confronted with changes in payer mix and how specific 
improvements to the revenue cycle affect revenue cycle management outcomes. Future 
work should explore in more detail the changes in revenue cycle management that 
hospitals implement in response to changes in payer mix with the help of case studies, 
interviews, or surveys since detailed data on hospitals’ internal revenue cycle 
management policies and practices is generally not publicly available.  
 
Potential endogeneity of payer mix 
The study design does not allow me to determine whether payer mix is endogenous, 
which may violate the assumptions of the linear regression model and lead to biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates. Payer mix may be endogenous to revenue cycle 
management performance because payer mix not only affects a hospital’s revenue cycle 
management performance, but revenue cycle management may also include policies and 





terms vary substantially across payers and payer mix thus represents an important 
determinant of revenue cycle management performance. Revenue cycle managers, on the 
other hand, are not completely at the mercy of the hospital’s payers. Some managers 
engage in more revenue-cycle friendly contracting than others and are able to negotiate 
more favorable payment rates and terms (Berger 2008; May 2004). Moreover, as part of 
their revenue cycle management, hospitals increasingly focus on uninsured and self-pay 
patients.
3
 During patient registration, many hospitals now routinely offer financial 
counseling to help patients without health insurance find coverage or enroll in a payment 
plan. Some uninsured patients, for instance, are eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP but may 
require assistance with the enrollment process. Others may be eligible for COBRA 
coverage through a former employer but may need help paying for the premiums. While 
effective revenue cycle management may allow hospitals to somewhat change their payer 
mix, the overall effect is likely small. A hospital’s payer mix depends to a large extent on 
the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the populations served, which do 
not change much in the short run. Hospitals in areas with an above-average proportion of 
elderly residents, for instance, receive higher shares of patient revenue from Medicare 
whereas hospitals in areas with an above-average proportion of low-income residents 
receive higher shares of patient revenue from Medicaid and self-pay patients. The 
exogeneity of hospital payer mix is also empirically supported by the relatively small 
within group standard deviations of all hospital payer mix variables included in this 
analysis (Table 3.7).  
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No consideration of major changes in reimbursement by government payers 
Caution should be exercised when extrapolating the findings of this study to major 
changes in government reimbursement rates and terms as proposed, for instance, as a 
result of the recent economic downturn or the health reform bill passed in March 2010. 
This study relies on hospital financial information for the years 2000 to 2007, the most 
recent years for which data is available. While budget pressures combined with the 
acceleration of hospital cost growth have forced government payers to consider cutting 
payment rates for the publicly insured (Friedman et al. 2004), no major changes to how 
government payers reimburse hospitals were made during this period of time.  
Continued fiscal stress related to the recent economic downturn, however, has 
increased states’ budget shortfalls and forced many of them to cut Medicaid enrollment, 
benefits, and provider reimbursement rates (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured 2010). So far, funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) have helped states to avoid more severe cuts in provider reimbursement rates. 
Since increases in states’ Medicaid budgets as a result of ARRA funds, however, are 
currently set to expire at the end of 2010, most states have already announced that they 
are planning on reducing provider rates in the near future to help balance their budgets. 
As a result, hospitals serving large and growing numbers of Medicaid patients may 
experience reductions in patient revenues. Moreover, substantial changes in the health 
care system as a result of the passage of health reform, such as the requirement that most 
U.S. citizens and legal residents purchase health insurance coverage starting in 2014 





Hospitals will likely benefit from an individual insurance mandate since it will reduce the 
number of uninsured and other self-pay patients and thus bolster hospitals’ revenues. 
 
No focus on costs and profitability by payer group 
Finally, my analysis of payer mix focuses on patient revenues and does not allow me to 
draw any conclusions about the relationship between payer mix and costs or payer mix 
and profitability. Recent research underscores the importance of effective revenue cycle 
management for highly profitable hospitals alongside traditional cost containment efforts. 
An analysis using 2008 hospital financial data conducted by Thomson Reuters (2009), for 
instance, showed that the difference in net operating revenues per adjusted discharge 
between the most and the least profitable hospitals was $854 whereas the difference in 
operating expenses per adjusted discharge was only $316. Nonetheless, revenue is only 
one factor in the determination of hospitals’ profitability. The cost of providing care 
represents the second component in this calculation. Costs of treatment may be lower for 
Medicare and Medicaid patients if hospitals provide fewer services to these patients in 
order to avoid or at least reduce losses. Empirical studies have found that the provision of 
hospital services varies with patients’ insurance coverage and that privately insured 
patients tend to receive more services than publicly insured patients (see, for instance, 
Braveman et al. 1991). The overall cost of treating publicly insured patients may, on the 
other hand, be higher given that the health status of many Medicare and Medicaid 
patients is worse than that of most privately insured patients and their need for services 
thus greater. There is, for instance, evidence that patients of lower socioeconomic status, 





hospitals to spend more resources when treating these patients (see, for instance, Epstein 
et al. 1990). 
 
Conclusion 
This study finds no evidence that government payers undermine hospitals’ ability to 
generate and collect patient care revenue. Even though Medicare and Medicaid are 
known to pay hospitals less than private payers, hospitals with more publicly insured 
patients do not collect substantially lower average patient revenues. Moreover, Medicare 
pays hospitals faster than most private payers, which benefits hospitals as it reduces their 
average collection periods. For hospital managers, these findings may represent good 
news. They show that, despite increases in the number of publicly insured patients 
served, managers are frequently able to generate adequate amounts of patient revenue and 
collect it in a timely fashion. Policymakers, however, should exercise caution when 
interpreting these findings and considering changes in government payers’ 
reimbursement of hospitals. The results of this study do not necessarily suggest that the 
reimbursement rates and terms set by government payers are adequate to ensure 
hospitals’ financial viability and thus guarantee access to needed hospital services for the 
publicly insured. While hospitals serving large numbers of Medicare and Medicaid 
patients may be able to maintain average amounts of patient revenue through effective 
revenue cycle management and continued cost containment, these hospitals may also be 
forced to shift more of the costs of care to privately insured and uninsured patients, 
reduce the provision of services to Medicare and Medicaid patients, postpone needed 
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Chapter 4  
 
Short-Term Financial Management and Long-Term Financial Performance: What 
is the Link between Revenue Cycle Management, Profitability, and Not-for-Profit 
Hospitals’ Ability to Grow Equity? 
 
Abstract 
Hospitals’ profitability and ability to grow equity represent key factors in their efforts to 
maintain the up-to-date facilities and equipment needed to attract well-trained health care 
professionals and provide high-quality patient care. Unlike for-profit hospitals, which can 
raise equity by issuing shares, not-for-profit hospitals rely mainly on retained earnings 
from both operating and non-operating activities to build their equity capital. Hospitals’ 
core operating activity is the provision of patient care. Hence, managing the flow of 
patients through the hospital, from appointment scheduling and patient registration at the 
front end of the revenue cycle to discharge and billing at the back end, has the potential to 
boost hospitals’ profitability and strengthen their ability to grow equity capital. 
Using panel data from audited financial statements for bond-issuing, not-for-profit 
hospitals for the years 2000 to 2007, this study finds that effective revenue cycle 
management is indeed positively associated with not-for-profit hospitals’ profitability and 
ability to grow equity. This link is found to be particularly strong for measures of 
hospitals’ operating performance, indicating that the pathway through which revenue 
cycle management improves hospitals’ long-term financial performance focuses on 





positively. Efforts aimed at managing the revenue cycle more effectively may frequently 
be worthwhile investments that have the potential to strengthen the financial viability of 
an organization in the long term. 
 
Introduction 
Hospitals’ profitability and ability to grow equity represent key factors in their efforts to 
maintain the up-to-date facilities and equipment needed to attract well-trained health care 
professionals and provide high-quality patient care. Profitable hospitals are able to retain 
and reinvest more of their earnings, which translates into higher growth in equity capital. 
For not-for-profit hospitals in particular, retained earnings represent the most important 
source of equity. Unlike their for-profit counterparts, not-for-profit hospitals cannot raise 
equity externally by issuing shares (Rivenson et al. 2000). Managers of not-for-profit 
hospitals thus have to focus their efforts to build equity on their organizations’ internal 
operations and supplement these efforts with profitable non-operating activities, 
including raising capital through donations and gifts and managing their often substantial 
endowments and financial investments. In the current business environment, however, in 
which many hospitals have lost substantial parts of their endowments and are 
experiencing shrinking donation and gift receipts, boosting the profitability of operating 
activities has gained in importance for the purpose of building equity capital. 
Hospitals’ core operating activity is the provision of patient care. Hence, 
managing the flow of patients through the hospital, from appointment scheduling and 





back end, is of crucial importance. Aimed at generating higher patient revenues and 
reducing average collection periods, the effective management of the revenue cycle has 
the potential not only to boost hospitals’ operating performance but also to improve their 
total profitability and thus strengthen their ability to grow equity. Despite practitioners’ 
continued interest in revenue cycle management (Danielson and Fuller 2007; Hammer 
2005; Ladewig and Hecht 1993; May 2004), to this date, however, no empirical study has 
examined its association with hospitals’ profitability and ability to build equity.  
This research attempts to fill some of the gaps in the literature and explores 
whether effective revenue cycle management can help managers of not-for-profit 
hospitals improve their organizations’ profitability, strengthen their ability to grow equity 
capital, and thus remain financially viable in the long term. More specifically, this study 
analyzes the relationship between two measures of revenue cycle management 
performance, the amount of patient revenue a hospital generates and the speed with 
which a hospital collects its patient revenue, and several measures of hospitals’ 
profitability and equity value. It attempts to answer the following research questions: 
What is the link between revenue cycle management performance and not-for-profit 
hospitals’ operating and total profit margins? What is the relationship between revenue 
cycle management performance and not-for-profit hospitals’ free cash flow? And, finally, 
does effective revenue cycle management translate into higher values of equity capital for 
not-for-profit hospitals? Besides contributing to the small but growing literature on the 
relationship between elements of firms’ short-term financial management — including 
revenue cycle management —and their long-term financial performance, the answers to 





they seek to improve their organizations’ long-term financial viability by investing in 
more effective revenue cycle management policies and practices. 
 
Background and literature review 
Historically, short-term financial management, or working capital management as 
accounting scholars sometimes refer to it, has not received much attention in the 
corporate finance literature (Sartoris and Hill 1983; Smith 1973). The main reason for 
this historic neglect was the predominant academic focus on market efficiency, which 
formed the basis for the development of corporate finance theory (Cohn and Pringle 
1980; Sartoris and Hill 1983). Under the assumption of perfectly efficient financial 
markets, short-term financial management is irrelevant since it cannot be used to increase 
firm value (Lewellen, McConnell, and Scott 1980) and firms thus have no incentive to 
hold short-term financial assets of any kind (Cohn and Pringle 1980).  
Using the management of accounts receivable as an example, Lewellen, 
McConnell, and Scott (1980) demonstrate that in perfectly competitive markets the 
availability of trade credit affects neither sales volumes nor firm values. In such a 
situation, there can only be one effective price for a commodity because the firms 
producing and selling the commodity all seek to maximize their value to the point where 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost. All credit terms that are acceptable to both sellers 
and buyers are the present value equivalent of cash terms and thus perfect substitutes 
from a valuation standpoint. Rather than holding short-term financial assets that promise 





In the conclusion of their paper, however, Lewellen, McConnell, and Scott (1980, 
p. 112) acknowledge that there are financial market imperfections ―that might impact the 
trade credit decision and allow an opportunity for the ingenious design of credit policy to 
affect firm value‖. Market imperfections that may allow managers to use short-term 
financial management strategies to affect firm value include taxes (Brick and Fung 1984), 
illiquidity and bankruptcy costs (Emery 1984), transaction costs (Ferris 1981; Schwartz 
1974), asymmetric information (Smith 1987), and legal restrictions, such as the ban on 
direct price discrimination (Mian and Smith 1992; Petersen and Rajan 1997). In reality, 
where financial market imperfections are ubiquitous, short-term financial management 
may thus play an important role in firms’ long-term financial viability. Holding short-
term financial assets, such as cash, marketable securities, and accounts receivable, may 
yield excess returns and thus allow managers to boost their organizations’ profitability 
and grow their equity capital (Cohn and Pringle 1980). The management of short-term 
assets and liabilities as well as the relationship between short-term financial management 
and firms’ long-term financial performance thus warrant the careful investigation by both 
corporate finance researchers and financial managers. 
Empirical research on the relationship between firms’ short-term financial 
management and their long-term financial performance started in the early 1990s with 
studies conducted for a variety of industries in several different countries over different 
periods of time. With his examination of 2,000 U.S. firms in 20 different industries 
between 1970 and 1989, Soenen (1993) was among the first to show that effective short-
term financial management, measured in terms of the length of the cash conversion cycle 





payable), was associated with higher profitability. This relationship, however, depended 
on the industry under study and was generally not very strong. Using similar data for 
2,718 U.S. firms for 1974 to 1993, Jose, Lancaster, and Stevens (1996) were able to 
replicate the results by Soenen (1993). They found that shorter cash conversion cycles 
were associated with both improved return on assets and return on equity thus offering 
strong evidence that for most firms and most industries, aggressive working capital 
management policies enhance financial performance. 
Besides providing additional empirical evidence for the negative relationship 
between the length of firms’ cash conversion cycle and their profitability, Shin and 
Soenen (1998) showed that the length of the cash conversion cycle was also significantly 
negatively correlated with firms’ stock returns. Reducing the cash conversion cycle to a 
reasonable minimum may allow managers not only to improve their firms’ profitability 
but also to create shareholder value, a hypothesis that has not yet been tested empirically 
but will be explored in this study. 
More recently, Deloof (2003) and Lazaridis and Tryfonidis (2006) investigated 
the relationship between the length of the cash conversion cycle and firm profitability 
using firm-level fixed effects regressions rather than the simple correlation and ordinary 
least squares regression analyses employed in prior empirical work. Using data for 
publicly traded firms in Belgium and Greece, respectively, both studies found negative 
associations between the length of the cash conversion cycle and firms’ profitability thus 
confirming prior empirical evidence. More importantly, however, when separately 
analyzing the link between each of the three components of the cash conversion cycle and 





inventory and accounts receivable were associated with increases in profitability as were 
decreases in the number of days held in accounts payable. 
To date, no empirical study has explicitly focused on exploring the relationship 
between elements of not-for-profit hospitals’ short-term financial management — in 
particular their management of the revenue cycle — and their long-term financial 
performance. Not-for-profit hospitals clearly do not face efficient capital markets (Reiter 
2004) and effective revenue cycle management may thus allow hospital managers to 
boost their organizations’ profitability and strengthen their ability to grow equity capital. 
Descriptive research has supported the idea that high-performing hospitals manage the 
revenue cycle more effectively than low-performing hospitals (Cleverley 1990; 
Danielson and Fuller 2007; Eldenburg, Schaffer, and Zulauf 2004). Financially well off 
hospitals have been found to record both higher amounts of patient revenue as a result of 
higher gross charges and lower revenue deductions and write-offs as well as lower 
average collection periods as a result of lower investments in accounts receivable 
(Cleverley 1990; Solucient 2005). Moreover, empirical studies of the factors associated 
with hospital profitability have shown that short-term financial management in general, 
and the management of patient revenues and patient receivables in particular, matters 
(Cody, Friss, and Hawkinson 1995; Gapenski and Vogel 1993). None of these studies, 
however, has used a comprehensive definition of hospital revenue cycle management 
performance in terms of both the amount and the speed of patient revenue collection nor 
has any of these studies extended the analysis to indicators of hospitals’ long-term 







Aimed at increasing the amount and the speed of patient revenue collection, the effective 
management of the revenue cycle has important implications for hospitals’ profitability 
and ability to grow their equity capital. The following discussion will first focus on the 
relationship between revenue cycle management and hospital profitability before 
examining the relationship between revenue cycle management and hospitals’ equity 
values. 
 
Revenue cycle management and hospital profitability 
Generating higher amounts of patient revenue as a result of more effective revenue cycle 
management has a direct effect on hospital profitability. As part of their management of 
the revenue cycle, hospital managers may pursue more aggressive pricing and attempt to 
reduce revenue deductions, in particular contractual allowances granted to third-party 
payers and charity care, resulting in higher net patient revenues. In addition, more 
effective revenue cycle management may reduce the number of uninsured and self-pay 
patients a hospital serves and, consequently, bad debt expenses and operating expenses. 
Higher patient revenue and lower operating expenses result in higher operating income, 
net income, and operating cash flows, all of which improve a hospital’s profitability. 
Stockamp, a well-known revenue cycle management consultancy, provides examples of 
improved hospital profitability due to more effective revenue cycle management. Dallas 
based Baylor Health Care System, for instance, was able to record over $20 million of 





management processes, and Inova Health System in Falls Church, VA, another Stockamp 
client, reported annually recurring income statement benefits of $45 million.
4
 
The second financial benefit of effective revenue cycle management, collecting 
patient revenue faster, has an indirect effect on not-for-profit hospitals’ profitability. 
Higher speed of revenue collection lowers the balances of accounts receivable on a 
hospital’s balance sheet, which minimizes the need for short-term borrowing and reduces 
interest expenses (Soenen 1993). Lower interest expenses reduce operating expenses and 
consequently increase a hospital’s operating and net income. Again, referring to the 
examples provided by Stockamp, Baylor Health Care System benefited from $18 million 
in balance sheet improvements as a result of managing its revenue cycle more effectively. 
Likewise, Inova Health System was able to increase its patient cash collection by twelve 
percent, decrease its days in accounts receivable by eleven percent, and as a result record 
a balance sheet benefit of $24 million.
5
  
Besides reducing short-term liabilities and interest expenses, shorter collection 
periods may also generate surplus cash that can be invested in short-term financial 
securities (Soenen 1993). Unlike their for-profit counterparts, which can return excess 
cash to shareholders in the form of dividends and stock repurchases, not-for-profit 
hospitals, which do not have this option, tend to hoard excess cash. As a result, not-for-
profit hospitals typically maintain substantial financial investments whose earnings 
represent non-operating revenue and improve profitability through higher net income.  
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 Examples from Stockamp website available at http://stockamp.com/index.jsp?pageID=casestudies. 
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Revenue cycle management and hospital equity values 
Effective revenue cycle management increases not only a hospital’s profitability but also 
its equity value since fundamentally, a firm’s equity value is driven by profitability and 
growth (Lundholm and Sloan 2004). By expressing equity value as a function of these 
two drivers, the residual income valuation model exploits this intuition. Residual income 
is commonly defined as the amount that accounting earnings exceed the capital charge on 
the book value of equity invested in the firm. Notationally:  
 
where RIt  is the residual income in year t, NIt is the net income in year t, re is the cost of 
equity capital, and Bt–1 is the book value of equity at the end of year t–1. Residual income 
can also be expressed in terms of return on equity, a commonly used measure of 
profitability, as can be seen in the following equation: 
 
where ROEt is the return on equity for year t, and RIt , NIt, re, and Bt–1 are defined as 
above. The residual income model then computes the equity value of the firm as the sum 
of its initial equity book value plus the present value of future residual income flows 
(Lundholm and Sloan 2004). The estimated equity value V0 at time 0, i.e., at the time of 







where B0 is the equity book value at time 0 and RIt and re are defined as above. If a firm 
earns future accounting income at a rate exactly equal to its cost of equity capital, then 
the present value of its future residual income is zero, and V0 equals B0. Firms that 
neither create nor destroy wealth are worth only their current equity book value. 
However, firms whose ROEs are higher than re have equity values greater than their book 
values and vice versa (Frankel and Lee 1998). The immediate relationship between 
profitability and equity value can be seen when firm value is rewritten as: 
 
As described in detail above, effective revenue cycle management increases a hospital’s 
operating and non-operating revenue and decreases its operating expenses. Consequently, 
a hospital’s net income and return on equity, commonly defined as the ratio of net income 
to equity, go up. At the same time, effective revenue cycle management reduces some of 
the uncertainty associated with generating and collecting patient revenues by establishing 
policies and practices that enable the hospital to record all necessary demographic, 
clinical, and insurance information before and during the provision of care and thus 
improve its coding, billing, and cash collections. Since the provision of patient care is the 
core business of most hospitals better revenue cycle management reduces a hospital’s 
collection risk and thus its business risk. Lower business risk, on the other hand, reduces 
the costs of equity capital. As a result, both hospitals’ residual income and their residual 





Effective revenue cycle management, however, not only increases a hospital’s 
operating and total profit margins but also its free cash flow. Discounted cash flow 
valuation thus provides an alternative framework for how effective revenue cycle 
management may help a firm strengthen the value of its equity capital. The classic 
discounted cash flow valuation model defines a firm’s equity value as a function of its 
free cash flow and its weighted average cost of capital plus excess cash and investments 
minus long-term debt (Brealey, Myers, and Allen 2007; Grant 1989). Notationally:  
 
whereby FCFt is the projected free cash flow in period t, WACC is the weighted average 
cost of capital, and ExcessCasInv0 and LTDebt0 are the excess cash and investments and 
the long-term debt a hospital holds at the time of the valuation, respectively. 
As described in detail above, effective revenue cycle management increases a 
hospital’s operating and non-operating revenue and decreases its operating expenses 
resulting in higher net income and operating cash flow. Effective revenue cycle 
management also reduces a hospital’s balance in accounts receivable and thus its net 
working capital. Both the increase in net income and the decrease in net working capital 
increase a hospital’s free cash flow. Moreover, effective revenue cycle management 
reduces a hospital’s weighted average cost of capital by reducing some of the uncertainty 
associated with generating and collecting patient revenue and thus the business risk of the 
hospital. Lower business risk decreases a hospital’s cost of equity capital, which is a 





effects on both free cash flows and the weighted average cost of capital, effective revenue 




Based on previous empirical studies (Deloof 2003; Lazaridis and Tryfonidis 2006) and 
the conceptual framework outlined above, I analyze the relationship between revenue 
cycle management and not-for-profit hospitals’ financial performance using ordinary 
least squares regressions with hospital-level fixed or random effects, whenever 
appropriate. I estimate two models: 
 
 
 The dependent variables analyzed in the first model are measures of hospital 
profitability, Pit, and the dependent variables analyzed in the second model are measures 
of hospital equity value, Vit. The independent variables of interest for both models are 
indicators of a hospital’s performance at managing the revenue cycle, RCMit. A set of 
control variables, Xit and Yit, is included in each model containing hospital-level 
organizational and financial characteristics as well as state and year dummy variables. 
The subscripts i and t refer to hospital i in year t. In all regressions, standard errors are 
calculated using White’s correction for heteroskedasticity.  
Because of the potential for hospital-level variation in profitability and firm value, 





heterogeneity across facilities, whenever appropriate (Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Greene 
2008). Profitability and firm value vary substantially across hospitals. Part of this 
variation is explained by externally observable hospital characteristics, such as size, 
ownership, and location. Another part of the variation, however, may be due to time-
invariant hospital characteristics that cannot be observed externally, such as internal 
managerial policies and practices or the quality of the managerial staff (Cody, Friss, and 
Hawkinson 1995; Gapenski, Vogel, and Langland-Orban 1993). In general, hospital-
specific characteristics can be modeled with hospital-level variables, with fixed effects, 
or with random effects. To determine whether fixed or random effects were preferred 
over ordinary least squares regression Breusch-Pagan tests were conducted. In all but two 
cases (residual income based equity values and residual income based equity values 
based solely on a hospital’s operations), Breusch-Pagan tests rejected the null hypothesis 
that the variance of the random effects was zero implying that either fixed or random 
effects were preferred to ignoring hospital-specific effects altogether. Then, in a second 
step, Hausman tests of the null hypothesis that the hospital-level effects were random 
were conducted to decide whether to include fixed or random effects. In two cases 
(operating profit margin and free cash flow), Hausman tests indicated that random effects 
were preferred over fixed effects while in the other two cases (total profit margin and 
discounted cash flow based equity values), Hausman tests indicated that fixed effects 








Following the conceptual framework, the dependent variables used in this study consist 
of six measures of hospital financial performance: In the first model, three measures of 
hospital profitability — total profit margin, operating profit margin, and free cash flow — 
are analyzed; in the second model, three measures of hospitals’ equity values — two 
estimates of equity value based on residual income valuation and one estimate based on 
discounted cash flow valuation — are examined.  
 
Hospital profitability 
In general, a hospital’s profitability can be measured in terms of either accounting profits 
or cash flows (Ehreth 1994; Gapenski, Vogel, and Langland-Orban 1993; Phillips 2003). 
Accounting indicators, such as total and operating profit margins, are commonly used to 
assess hospitals’ financial performance and have great acceptance among practitioners 
(Cleverley 1990, Solucient 2005). Accountants prefer accounting earnings because they 
rely on accrual accounting and thus provide a more accurate estimate of the economic 
value added during a given time period. Finance scholars, on the other hand, have argued 
that a hospital’s true financial condition is more closely related to the cash flow it 
generates than to its reported income, which can be subject to managerial manipulation 
(Gapenski, Vogel, and Langland-Orban 1993). Not-for-profit hospitals in particular have 
been found to engage in managerial earnings management relying on judgment in the use 
of discretionary accounting accruals, such as the allowance for bad debt expense, to meet 





equity values calculated based on accounting profits — may thus provide inadequate and 
at times misleading information about the financial health of not-for-profit hospitals 
(Kane 1991). 
Despite these concerns, total profit margin remains one of the most popular 
indicators of hospital profitability (Clement, D’Aunno, and Poyzer 1993; Cleverley 1990; 
Ehreth 1994; Solucient 2005). Total profit margin is calculated as the difference between 
a hospital's total revenue and its total expenses (i.e., its excess of revenue over expenses, 
or net income) divided by total revenue. It represents the overall profitability of the firm 
per dollar of revenue earned. A second commonly used measure of hospital profitability 
is operating profit margin, which measures profitability solely with respect to patient care 
services and other operating activities (Cleverley 1990; Solucient 2005). Operating profit 
margin is calculated as the difference between a hospital’s operating revenue and its 
operating expenses (i.e., its operating income) divided by operating revenue. It represents 
the percentage of operating revenues converted into operating income. 
Moreover, in response to the above mentioned concerns regarding accounting 
measures of profitability, the concept of free cash flow has gained in importance as a 
measure of hospital profitability, mainly because free cash flow is less vulnerable to 
managerial earnings management and thus more objective (Horngren et al. 2006; Kane 
1991). Hence, for the purpose of this research, free cash flow is analyzed as an additional 
measure of not-for-profit hospitals’ profitability. Free cash flow is calculated as the 
change in net assets plus interest and noncash expenses minus investments in fixed assets 





undertaking the firm’s operations and making all investments necessary to ensure its 
continued operation (Horngren et al. 2006; Phillips 2003). 
 
Hospital equity values 
Unlike profitability, measuring equity values is challenging, particularly for not-for-profit 
hospitals (Long 1976; McCue, McCue, and Wheeler 1988; Phillips 2003). While the 
market value of for-profit hospitals’ equity can easily be calculated as the product of 
share price and the number of shares outstanding, the corresponding equity value for not-
for-profit hospitals involves forecasting their future financial performance either in terms 
of cash flows or accounting profits and deriving an estimate of their equity value by 
discounting these forecasts (Long 1976; Phillips 2003). Two commonly used valuation 
methods are based on this principle: discounted cash flow valuation, the gold standard in 
corporate finance, and residual income valuation, a technique advocated for and used by 
accounting scholars. Finance scholars have long recommended the use of discounted cash 
flow valuation techniques for purposes of valuing not-for-profit organizations including 
hospitals (Grant 1989; Long 1976; Phillips 2003). Residual income valuation techniques, 
on the other hand, have not yet been employed for this purpose. Focusing on earnings 
rather than dividends, and thus on wealth creation rather than wealth distribution, residual 
income valuation may, however, be particularly suitable for valuing firms that do not pay 
dividends, such as not-for-profit organizations (Stowe et al. 2007). Hence, for the purpose 
of this research, both discounted cash flow and residual income valuation models are 





Focusing on equity book values and earnings, residual income valuation provides 
a simple model that allows users to quickly estimate a firm’s equity value (Lee 1996) and 
existing empirical research has generally provided enthusiastic support for this technique 
(Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1999). For the purpose of this research, residual income 
based estimates of hospitals’ equity values are obtained using a discounted residual 
income approach sometimes referred to as the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson valuation technique. 
Following Frankel and Lee (1998) and Stowe and colleagues (2007), I estimate equity 
value at time t, Vt, using the following simple approach of a short-horizon earnings 
forecast for one year:  
 
where Bt is the equity book value at time t, FROEt is the forecasted return on equity for 
the period t, re is the cost of equity capital, and g is the long-term growth rate. In theory, 
the forecast horizon should be set large enough for firms to reach their competitive 
equilibrium (Frankel and Lee 1998). In practice, however, the ability to forecast returns 
on equity diminishes quickly over time, and forecasting errors are compounded in longer 
expansions. As a result, I use a forecast horizon of one year only. 
The four parameters needed for the estimation are the equity book value (Bt ), the 
return on equity forecasts (FROEt), the cost of equity capital (re ), and the long-term 
growth rate (g). First, equity book values are obtained from the hospital's balance sheet. 
For the purpose of this study, I use a hospital’s total net assets as the measure of its equity 
book value. Unlike their for-profit counterparts, not-for-profit hospitals separate their 
equity into restricted and unrestricted net assets. While the use of restricted net assets is 





research and teaching, and plant replacements, unrestricted net assets have no such 
restrictions attached to them and hospital managers thus have considerable discretion 
over how to use these funds. Both restricted and unrestricted net assets, however, 
represent equity capital and hospital managers do not care particularly about accounting 
classifications when attempting to grow the equity of their organization. Moreover, there 
are several interrelations between restricted and unrestricted net assets and funds 
categorized as restricted may become unrestricted over time. A donation restricted for the 
purchase of medical equipment, for instance, is recorded as a temporarily restricted net 
asset upon receipt of the donation. Once the medical equipment is purchased, however, 
the temporarily restricted net asset is released from restrictions and becomes part of the 
hospital’s unrestricted net assets. A contribution to an endowment fund, on the other 
hand, always remains permanently restricted. Any income earned on the endowment 
fund, however, is recorded as investment income in the hospital’s statement of operations 
and, consequently, increases its unrestricted net assets.  
Second, to estimate a hospital’s residual income based equity value I calculate the 
cost of equity capital as the simple average of a hospital's return on equity over the past 
five years whereby — following the definition of equity book value in terms of total net 
assets and adjusting the income statement to reflect a clean surplus (Stowe et al. 2007) — 
return on equity is defined as the change in net assets divided by total net assets. In 
theory, the cost of a firm’s equity capital should reflect the premium demanded by equity 
investors to invest in a firm or project with comparable risk, which is given by the stock 
market (Frankel and Lee 1998; Wheeler and Smith 1988). In the absence of a residual 





to determine and the hospital’s board of directors must usually provide guidance on the 
return required by the community for capital investments (Wheeler and Smith 1988). The 
rate of return on a hospital’s equity should thus be derived from its long-range financial 
plan, which indicates the rate of growth necessary to achieve the institution's goals 
(Conrad 1984; Wheeler and Clement 1990). Hence, one common approach to 
determining the required return on equity for not-for-profit organizations is to calculate 
the actual return on equity over the past few years, which can then serve as a starting 
point in establishing future target growth rates (Wheeler and Smith 1988). 
Third, I use a hospital’s current return on equity — defined as the change in net 
assets divided by total net assets — to proxy for its future return on equity (Frankel and 
Lee 1998). Forecasting future returns on equity represents the most important and 
difficult task in the residual income valuation exercise. In general, there are two 
alternative methods to forecast future returns on equity: analysts' earnings forecasts or 
prior period returns. Since analysts' earnings forecasts are not available for not-for-profit 
hospitals, the latter alternative is employed in this study.  
Finally, since the single-stage residual income model used in this study implies 
that a hospital has a constant return on equity and a constant earnings growth rate in 
perpetuity, I assume a long-term growth rate of one percent, which may, however, be a 
rather conservative estimate of hospitals’ growth potentials. In the past two decades, 
health expenditures have grown at average annual rates of around seven percent 
(American Hospital Association 2009). The main reason for assuming a much lower 
growth rate for purposes of this research is that while hospitals’ earnings may be growing 





to reach a steady state in the near future. Major third-party payers are currently starting to 
reduce reimbursement rate increases and health policy makers are searching for ways to 




Besides estimating residual income based equity values based on a hospital’s total 
profitability, I also estimate hypothetical equity values based solely on a hospital’s 
operating performance. As discussed above, revenue cycle management focuses on 
generating and collecting revenue from the provision of patient care, which represents the 
main line of business for hospitals. Effective revenue cycle management thus increases 
hospitals’ operating revenue, reduces their operating expenses, and improves their 
operating profitability. Effective revenue cycle management does not, however, change 
the way not-for-profit hospitals manage their often substantial endowments and financial 
investments with the exception of generating limited surplus funds that may be used for 
investment purposes. Similar to the analysis of operating margin, the analysis of 
hospitals’ hypothetical equity values based solely on operations may thus shed light on 
whether revenue cycle management is indeed more strongly related with hospitals’ 
operating performance than with their overall performance.  
To estimate hypothetical equity values based solely on operating performance, I 
redefine return on equity to reflect only the hospital’s operating activities. This redefined 
return on equity is calculated as the ratio of the hospital’s change in net assets adjusted 
for non-operating income to the hospital’s total net assets adjusted for assets not used in 
operations. More specifically, I calculate the adjusted change in net assets, the numerator, 
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as the change in net assets multiplied by the ratio of operating income to net income. The 
denominator, adjusted net assets, is calculated as total net assets multiplied by the ratio of 
non-financial assets to total assets. Non-financial assets include all of a hospital’s assets 
with the exception of long-term investments and assets limited as to use, both of which 
consist of cash and investments that are not used in day-to-day operations but are mainly 
held to generate investment income. The cost of equity capital is then estimated as the 
average of the hospital's redefined return on equity over the past five years and the 
redefined return on equity for the current period is used to proxy for its future return on 
equity. While the so-calculated equity values based solely on operating performance 
cannot be interpreted as actual equity values they are intended to provide an estimate of 
the hypothetical equity value of a hospital if the hospital provided only patient care and 
other operating services, such as research and teaching, using all its assets for this 
purpose and did not engage in non-operating activities including managing endowments 
and other financial investments. 
Finally, besides accounting based estimates of a hospital’s equity value, a third 
estimate is obtained using discounted cash flow valuation, which defines a firm’s equity 
value as a function of its free cash flow and its weighted average cost of capital (Brealey, 






whereby FCFt is the projected free cash flow in period t, WACC is the weighted average 
cost of capital, and ExcessCasInv0 and LTDebt0 are the excess cash and investments and 
the long-term debt a hospital holds at the time of the valuation, respectively. 
First, not-for-profit hospitals’ free cash flow is defined as the change in net assets 
plus interest and noncash expenses minus investments in fixed assets and net working 
capital (Grant 1989). In practice, the valuation of a hospital requires projecting future free 
cash flows based on forecasted financial statements. In empirical research studies, 
however, the use of pro-forma information is not feasible because of the subjective nature 
of such information and the large number of hospitals for which detailed pro-forma 
financial statements would have to be developed (Phillips 2003). Consequently, future 
free cash flows are estimated using the simple average of the free cash flow of the current 
and two prior periods multiplied by an adjusted annual growth rate. For each hospital 
year observation in the dataset, five years of future free cash flow are calculated (Grant 
1989; Phillips 2003). The annual growth rate is defined as the average annual nominal 
growth rate in national health expenditures of 7.3 percent from 1990 to 2005 (American 
Hospital Association 2009) adjusted for differences in a hospital’s quality of earnings 
defined as net income divided by free operating cash flows (Phillips 2003). To adjust a 
hospital’s growth rate I standardize the distribution of the quality of earnings indicator so 
that hospitals with average earnings quality are assigned the average growth rate of 7.3 
percent. Hospitals with below-average earnings quality are assigned lower adjusted 
growth rates and hospitals with above-average earnings quality are assigned higher 
adjusted growth rates whereby adjusted growth rates range from 5.1 to 9.5 percent. 






whereby D is the value of the hospital’s debt, E is the value of the hospital’s equity, rD is 
the cost of debt financing, and rE is the cost of equity financing (Wheeler and Smith 
1988). For purposes of this research, D is defined in terms of a hospital’s book value of 
total liabilities and E is defined in terms of a hospital’s book value of total net assets 
since market values of debt and equity are not easily available for not-for-profit hospitals. 
Following Wheeler and Smith (1988), the cost of debt financing, rD, is calculated as net 
interest expense divided by a hospital’s long-term liabilities and the cost of equity 
financing, rE, is defined as the simple average of the hospital’s return on equity over the 
past five years as discussed above.  
The present value of a hospital’s free cash flows is then calculated as the 
forecasted free cash flows for the first five years discounted at the weighted average cost 
of capital plus the horizon value plus any excess cash and investments minus long-term 
debt. The horizon value is calculated using the forecasted free cash flow for year six in 
perpetuity discounted at the weighted average cost of capital. This calculation of the 
horizon value implies a growth rate of zero, which may, however, be a rather 
conservative estimate. As discussed above, the hospital industry is predicted to reach a 
steady state in the near future as both third-party payers and policy makers are starting to 
reduce reimbursement rate increases to contain ever increasing health care costs and thus 
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Hospital revenue cycle management performance, the independent variable of interest in 
this study, is measured using two financial indicators of hospitals’ ability to generate and 
collect patient revenue, net patient revenue per total assets as a measure of the amount of 
patient revenue and days in net accounts receivable as a measure of the speed with which 
patient revenue is collected. For the purpose of this research, both independent variables 
were lagged in the analyses to mitigate the problem of reverse causality. 
Days in net accounts receivable, also known as the average collection period, 
represents the most important financial measure of hospitals’ performance at revenue 
cycle management (Berger 2008; Hammer 2005; May 2004; Prince and Ramanan 1992; 
Quist and Robertson 2004; Solucient 2005). Calculated as net patient accounts receivable 
times 365 days divided by net patient revenue, the average collection period describes the 
number of days of net patient revenue that a hospital has due from patient billings after 
all revenue deductions.  
Besides the speed of revenue collection, Rauscher and Wheeler (2008) have 
argued that an equally important indicator of revenue cycle management performance is a 
hospital’s ability to generate patient revenue by reducing revenue deductions and write-
offs. This study measures the amount of revenue generated in terms of net patient 
revenue per total assets, which is defined as the ratio of a hospital’s case mix adjusted net 
patient revenues to total assets. Scaling net patient revenues by case mix index adjusts for 
differences in patients’ severity of illness across hospitals. Expressing net patient 
revenues as a percentage of total assets adjusts for differences in size across hospitals and 






Besides revenue cycle management, a number of factors, both internal and external to 
hospitals, have been found to be associated with their ability to perform well financially 
and grow their equity capital. One major limitation of fixed and random effects 
regression models, however, is that coefficients on time-invariant covariates cannot be 
estimated but are absorbed in the individual-level constant term. Lack of identification is 
the price of the robustness of the specification to unmeasured correlation between the 
common effects and the exogenous variables (Greene 2008). For the purpose of this 
study, lack of identification is a minor issue since I am only interested in the coefficients 
on the indicators of revenue cycle management performance, which varies within 
hospitals over time. Lack of identification, however, limits the number of control 
variables that can be included in analyses in which fixed or random effects are used to the 
ones described in the following. 
First, because of the interrelations between different aspects of short-term 
financial management, this study not only includes days in net accounts receivable but 
also controls for a second aspect of hospitals’ short-term financial management, the 
effectiveness of their management of short-term liabilities, measured in terms of days in 
accounts payable (Deloof 2003; Jose, Lancaster, and Stevens 1996; Lazaridis and 
Tryfonidis 2006; Shin and Soenen 2000; Soenen 1993). Days in accounts payable is 
defined as accounts payable times 365 days divided by net patient revenues. Improved 
long-term financial performance may not only be due to better revenue cycle 
management but also the result of changes in payment periods. Hospitals may, for 





borrowing and, consequently, their interest expenses, resulting in higher operating and 
total profit margins, reduced working capital requirements, and thus higher equity values.  
Moreover, besides effective working capital management many not-for-profit 
hospitals rely on non-operating income from endowments and other financial investments 
to improve their long-term financial performance (Gapenski, Vogel, and Langland-Orban 
1993). For the purpose of this study, the extent of a hospital’s financial assets is 
controlled for using the financial asset ratio. The financial asset ratio is calculated as the 
sum of a hospital’s long-term investments and limited use assets divided by its total 
assets. Hospitals with large endowments and financial investments earn considerable 
amounts of non-operating income, which increases their net income and total profit 
margin. Larger proportions of assets held in endowments and financial investments also 
generate additional cash inflows, all of which increase hospitals’ equity values.  
Besides financial assets, the condition of a hospital’s plant assets, measured in 
terms of their average accounting age, represents an important factor for hospitals’ 
profitability and their ability to build equity (McCue, McCue, and Wheeler 1988; Phillips 
2003). The average age of a hospital’s property, plant, and equipment is defined as 
accumulated depreciation divided by the current year’s depreciation expense. The impact 
of aging facilities on a hospital’s profitability and residual income based measures of 
equity value depends largely on which method the hospital has chosen to depreciate its 
fixed assets. Higher average age of property, plant, and equipment, however, increases 
the need to replace aging facilities and equipment resulting in increased cash outflows 
and, consequently, reduced free cash flows and lower discounted cash flow based equity 





In addition to the composition of a hospital’s assets, long-term financial 
performance depends on the capital structure of the organization (Deloof 2003; Gapenski, 
Vogel, and Langland-Orban 1993; Lazaridis and Tryfonidis 2006; Shin and Soenen 
2000). Capital structure is controlled for using the debt financing ratio, which is defined 
as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Hospitals with greater debt financing ratios 
incur higher interest expenses resulting in lower operating income and thus lower 
operating and total profit margins. Higher proportions of assets financed with debt also 
result in additional cash outflows required to service the debt and thus reduced free cash 
flows potentially reducing a hospital’s equity value. 
Focusing now on operations, the association between a hospital’s revenue cycle 
management policies and practices and its long-term financial performance also depends 
on the volume of care provided. While previous research has suggested a range of 
volume measures including admissions, discharges, patient days, and occupancy rates 
(Long 1976; McCue, McCue, and Wheeler 1988), for the purpose of this research, the 
volume of patient care provided is controlled for using the total number of patient days 
since the hospitals analyzed in this study have the fewest missing observations for this 
variable. In general, revenues are defined as price multiplied by quantity. Besides price 
effects as a result of more effective revenue cycle management, higher patient revenues 
may also be due to volume effects. Greater volumes of services provided translate into 
higher operating and total profit margins as well as increased free cash flow and thus 
have the potential to increase hospitals’ equity capital.  
Moreover, the association between revenue cycle management and long-term 





growth is measured in terms of the ratio of the difference between net patient revenues of 
the current and the previous period and net patient revenues of the previous period. 
Hospitals that experience substantial revenue growth may be able to increase current 
period earnings by recognizing revenues more quickly, for instance by recognizing 
reduced revenue deductions. Hospitals that experience substantial revenue growth may 
also record higher free cash flows if the increase in cash flow from operations exceeds 
the required increase in working capital, including potential increases in accounts 
receivable, all of which may translate into higher equity values. 
As discussed above, lack of identification constitutes a problem in fixed and 
random effects regression analyses. Ordinary least squares regression analysis without 
hospital-level fixed or random effects, on the other hand, not only allows for but 
frequently requires the inclusion of additional hospital-specific controls, such as 
indicators of size, ownership, and type, to mitigate omitted variable bias. Hence, all 
ordinary least squares regression analyses include three additional control variables: First, 
in order to control for differences in size across hospitals, the number of licensed beds is 
included as a control variable. While descriptive evidence suggests that larger hospitals 
are more profitable and record higher cash flows (Solucient 2005) empirical evidence on 
the relationship between hospitals’ size and their long-term financial performance is 
inconclusive (Cody, Friss, and Hawkinson 1995; Gapenski, Vogel, and Langland-Orban 
1993). Some authors have argued that larger hospitals may be more profitable due to the 
flexibility of beds used and economies of scale (Cody, Friss, and Hawkinson 1995) while 
others have made the opposite argument claiming that larger hospitals may actually 





Second, in order to control for differences in ownership, a binary variable 
indicating whether or not a hospital is affiliated with a hospital or health system is 
included as a control variable. Descriptive evidence suggests that system affiliated 
hospitals perform better financially than free-standing facilities (Solucient 2005). 
Empirical studies, however, do not support this claim but find that, controlling for other 
hospital and market characteristics, system affiliation is frequently not associated with 
hospitals’ long-term financial performance (Cody, Friss, and Hawkinson 1995; Gapenski, 
Vogel, and Langland-Orban 1993).  
Third, in order to account for differences between teaching and non-teaching 
hospitals, a binary variable indicating a hospital’s teaching status is included as a control 
variable. While descriptive evidence points to the fact that teaching hospitals are 
somewhat more profitable and record higher cash flows than non-teaching institutions 
(Solucient 2005) empirical studies conclude that teaching hospitals tend to perform 
worse, a finding that is consistent with the notion that the costs of supporting teaching 
programs are frequently not offset by the incremental revenues and subsidies generated 
by such programs (Gapenski, Vogel, and Langland-Orban 1993).  
Finally, besides hospital operational and financial characteristics, year and state 
dummy variables are included as controls. A binary variable for the calendar year of each 
hospital is included in all analyses to capture intertemporal changes in profitability and 
equity values that are common to all hospitals in the sample. Moreover, binary variables 
for each of the 50 U.S. states are included in all ordinary least squares regression analyses 





differences in location, such as differences in Medicaid reimbursement rates and policies 
or state-level insurance regulations. 
 
Data and sample 
Description of the data 
For the purpose of this study, I analyze audited financial statement information for all 
bond-issuing, not-for-profit U.S. hospitals collected and provided by Merritt Research 
Services.
8
 The analysis is limited to the years 2000 to 2007. The derivation of some of the 
variables, however, requires data from up to four prior years, i.e., hospital financial 
statement information for the years 1996 to 2007 is used in this study. 
 
Derivation of the samples 
In order to preserve the sample size as much as possible separate samples are derived for 
the analyses of hospital profitability, residual income based hospital equity values, and 
discounted cash flow based hospital equity values (Table 4.1). 
 
Analysis of hospital profitability 
The following steps were taken to derive the final sample of 1,170 hospitals and 6,062 
hospital year observations (Table 4.1): First, 294 hospital year observations were 
excluded because of missing or implausible values for operating profit margin, whereby 
implausible values were defined as those smaller than –20 percent and greater than 20 
percent. Second, 34 observations were excluded due to implausible values for total profit 
                                                 
8
 Audited financial statement information for bond-issuing, not-for-profit hospitals was supplied by Merritt 
Research Services, LLC of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The software to construct the dataset used in this research 





margin, whereby implausible values were again defined as those smaller than –20 percent 
and greater than 20 percent. Third, seven observations were dropped due to missing 
values for free cash flow. Fourth, with respect to the independent variables, 177 
observations were excluded due to missing values for days in net accounts receivable and 
120 observations were dropped due to missing values for net patient revenue per total 
assets. Finally, with respect to the control variables, 91 observations were excluded due 
to missing values for days in accounts payable, 32 observations were excluded due to 
missing values for average age of property, plant, and equipment, 141 observations were 
dropped due to implausible values for the debt financing ratio whereby implausible 
values were those smaller than zero and greater than one, 22 observations were excluded 
due to missing values for the financial asset ratio, and 2,691 observations were dropped 
because of missing values for patient days. The final sample represents 77.9 percent of all 
hospitals and 61.4 percent of all hospital year observations in the initial data set. 
 
Analysis of hospital residual income based equity values 
The following steps were taken to derive the final sample of 1,005 hospitals and 4,664 
hospital year observations (Table 4.1): First, 2,638 hospital year observations were 
excluded because of missing or implausible values for hospitals’ residual income based 
equity value. Among these were all observations for which the estimated cost of equity 
capital was negative as this cannot be the case in practice. Second, 25 observations were 
excluded due to missing or implausibly large values for days in net accounts receivable 
defined as values greater than 365 days. Third, 49 observations were excluded due to 





dropped due to missing values for days in accounts payable, 27 observations were 
excluded due to missing values for average age of property, plant, and equipment, and 
2,354 observations were excluded due to missing values for patient days. The final 
sample represents 66.9 percent of all hospitals and 47.2 percent of all hospital year 
observations in the initial data set. 
 
Analysis of hospital residual income based equity values based on operations  
The following steps were taken to derive the final sample of 885 hospitals and 3,732 
hospital year observations (Table 4.1): First, 3,570 hospital year observations were 
excluded because of missing or implausible values for hospitals’ residual income based 
equity value whereby again a substantial number of observations had to be dropped 
because of negative estimates of the cost of equity capital. Second, 25 observations were 
excluded due to missing or implausibly large values for days in net accounts receivable 
defined as values greater than 365 days. Third, 49 observations were excluded due to 
missing values for net patient revenue per total assets. Finally, 114 observations were 
dropped due to missing values for days in accounts payable, 27 observations were 
excluded due to missing values for average age of property, plant, and equipment, and 
2,354 observations were excluded due to missing values for patient days. The final 
sample represents 58.9 percent of all hospitals and 37.8 percent of all hospital year 





Analysis of hospital discounted cash flow based equity values 
The following steps were taken to derive the final sample of 879 hospitals and 3,310 
hospital year observations (Table 4.1): First, 5,174 hospital year observations were 
excluded because of missing values for hospitals’ discounted cash flow based equity 
values. More specifically, 1,981 observations were excluded because their forecasted free 
cash flow was missing or negative, which prevented the use of the simplified discounted 
cash flow valuation model developed above and would have required more detailed 
analysis and valuation on a case by case basis; 35 observations were dropped because 
earnings quality could not be assessed and no reliable estimate of the growth rate of the 
free cash flows could thus be calculated; 3,088 observations were excluded because the 
estimated return on equity was missing or negative; 71 observations were dropped 
because the weighted average cost of capital was missing or negative; and nine 
observations were excluded because information on long-term investments was missing. 
Moreover, nine observations were excluded because of missing values for days in net 
accounts receivable, 25 observations were excluded because of missing values for net 
patient revenues per total assets, 27 observations were excluded due to missing values for 
days in accounts payable, six observations were excluded due to missing values for 
average age of property, plant, and equipment, and 1,320 observations were dropped due 
to missing values for patient days. The final sample represents 58.5 percent of all 





Table 4.1: Sample Derivation 














Number of hospital 
year observations in 
the initial data set 
9,871 9,871 9,871 9,871 
Observations 
excluded due to 
missing or implausible 
values for: 
    
   Operating profit 
margin 
294 N/A N/A N/A 
   Total profit margin 34 N/A N/A N/A 
   Free cash flow 7 N/A N/A N/A 
   Residual income 
based equity value 
N/A 2,638 3,570 N/A 
   Discounted cash 
flow based equity 
value 
N/A N/A N/A 5,174 
   Days in net accounts 
receivable 
377 25 25 9 
   Net patient revenue 
per total assets 
120 49 49 25 
   Days in accounts 
payable 
91 114 114 27 
   Average age of 
property, plant, and 
equipment 
32 27 27 6 
   Debt financing ratio 141 0 0 0 
   Financial asset ratio 22 0 0 0 
   Patient days 2,691 2,354 2,354 1,320 
   Revenue growth 0 0 0 0 
Number of hospital 
year observations in 
the final sample (as a 
percentage of the 

















Representativeness of the final samples 
The missing data problems encountered in the process of deriving the samples raise the 
question of the extent to which the final samples are representative of all bond-issuing, 
not-for-profit U.S. hospitals. To provide an assessment of representativeness, a set of 
organizational and financial characteristics of the hospitals in the four final samples was 
compared to those of all hospitals (Table 4.2). The hospitals in the four final samples 
were found to be relatively similar to all bond-issuing, not-for-profit hospitals with the 
exception of financial performance. Hospitals in all four samples tended to recorded 
substantially higher operating and total profit margins than all bond-issuing, not-for-
profit hospitals. Hospitals in the final samples used to analyze both residual income and 
discounted cash flow based equity values, however, recorded the highest operating and 
total profit margins. This result is likely due to the fact that hospitals that did not perform 
well financially during all or parts of the study period, e.g. hospitals with negative 
forecasted free cash flows or negative estimated costs of equity capital, were excluded 
from the samples to allow the calculation of reasonable equity value estimates. 
Furthermore, hospitals for which discounted cash flow based equity values could be 
calculated were more likely to be part of a hospital system. This result is consistent with 
prior empirical evidence indicating that hospital systems frequently perform better 







Table 4.2: Representativeness of the Final Samples 



























332,680 356,919 360,888 373,010 358,749 




21.6% 21.5% 22.1% 23.9%** 21.7% 
Teaching 
hospitals 




1.32** 1.33** 1.33** 1.32** 1.31 
Occupancy 
rate 
62.1% 62.5%* 62.1% 62.5% 61.8% 
Average 
length of stay 




1.2** 1.7** 2.6** 2.5** 0.8 
Total profit 
margin 
3.9** 4.6** 5.0** 5.2** 3.5 
 
Notes: Sample means are presented for all variables. Actual sample sizes for the final samples and all 
hospitals that were used in the calculations may be lower than the number of hospital year observations 
because of missing or implausible data elements that were excluded for the comparisons and t-tests 
reported above. * denotes difference in means between the respective final sample and all hospitals is 
statistically significant at the five percent confidence level. ** denotes difference in means between the 









On average, hospitals reported total profit margins of 3.9 percent and operating profit 
margins of 1.2 percent (Table 4.3). Median total and operating profit margins were 3.9 
percent and 1.6 percent, respectively. Both total and operating profit margins varied 
considerably across hospitals as shown by the between group standard deviations of 3.8 
and 4.3, respectively. They also varied within hospitals but to a smaller extent, as shown 
by the within group standard deviations of 2.8 and 2.6, respectively. The median hospital 
reported free cash flows of $3,544,500 while the average free cash flow was $7,295,772. 
Unlike operating and total profit margins, free cash flows varied more within than across 
hospitals as evidenced by the within and between group standard deviations of 
$29,318,990 and $24,421,640, respectively. 
 
Hospital residual income based equity values 
As described above, the calculation of a hospital’s residual income based equity value is 
a function of the book value of its net assets, its cost of equity capital, its forecasted 
return on equity, and its long-term growth rate. Between 2000 and 2007, hospitals 
reported median net assets of $122,019,000. Their median cost of equity capital and 
forecasted return on equity were 6.8 percent and 7.4 percent, respectively, while their 
average cost of equity capital and forecasted return on equity were 7.4 percent and 7.3 
percent, respectively. For almost 50 percent of hospitals the forecasted future return on 





equity values. As a result, hospitals recorded median residual income based equity values 
of $105,008,500 but average residual income based equity values of –$1,175,310,000 
(Table 4.3). Residual income based equity values varied substantially both across and 
within hospitals as evidenced by the between and within group standard deviations of 
$38,300,000,000 and $84,400,000,000. 
 
Hospital residual income based equity values based on operations 
The calculation of a hospital’s equity value based solely on operations requires adjusting 
its cost of equity capital and its forecasted return on equity on the basis of its operating 
performance. Between 2000 and 2007, the median hospital reported adjusted costs of 
equity capital and adjusted forecasted returns on equity of 6.6 percent and 6.0 percent, 
respectively, while average costs of equity capital and adjusted forecasted returns on 
equity were 8.6 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively. The finding that both median and 
average forecasted return on equity were less than median and average cost of equity 
capital mirrors the trend of hospitals’ declining operating performance during the late 
1990s and early 2000s (American Hospital Association 2009). During this time, the 
proportion of hospitals with negative operating margins increased to almost 40 percent 
before declining to around 30 percent in the mid-2000s. As a result, median residual 
income based equity values based on operations only were $74,218,770, which is 
substantially lower than hospitals’ median net assets of $120,450,000 (Table 4.3). 
Average equity values were $1,236,656,000 despite a substantial proportion of hospitals 
for which the forecasted future return on equity was smaller than the cost of equity 





evidenced by the between and within group standard deviations of $16,000,000,000 and 
$32,500,000,000, respectively. 
 
Hospital discounted cash flow based equity values 
As described above, equity values based on discounted cash flow valuation are a function 
of a hospital’s free cash flows and its weighted average cost of capital. The hospitals in 
the sample reported median forecasted free cash flows of $6,233,833 per year, which, 
discounted at the median weighted average cost of capital of 5.2 percent, translated into a 
median present value of the projected free cash flows for the first five years of 
$32,973,200. The median present value of the horizon was $142,487,700 and the 
resulting median discounted cash flow based equity value was $144,763,600 (Table 4.3).  
Average discounted cash flow based equity values were $390,939,600 and varied 
substantially across hospitals as evidenced by the between group standard deviation of 
$783,358,800 but less within hospitals as evidenced by the within group standard 
deviation of $557,600,900. 
 
Comparison of residual income and discounted cash flow based equity values 
For the smallest of the four final samples, the sample of 3,310 hospital observations for 
which I was able to estimate discounted cash flow based equity values, the median 
residual income based equity value was $122,272,600 and the median residual income 
based equity value based on operations only was $79,288,590, compared to median 
discounted cash flow based equity values of $144,763,600. This translated into median 





are somewhat higher than the estimates reported in prior empirical studies. McCue, 
McCue, and Wheeler (1988), for instance, report an average price of $68,917 paid per 
bed in hospital mergers and acquisitions between 1978 and 1984. They also note, 
however, that the standard deviation of $50,547 for price per bed is very high, which 
suggests a great deal of variation in the actual prices paid per bed. A more recent study by 
Phillips (2003) finds that for 30 hospital mergers and acquisitions between 1992 and 
1996 the average price paid per bed was $322,456 with a standard deviation of $205,302. 
Finally, McCue and Kim (2005) report median prices per bed of between $110,416 and 
$316,335 for 67 hospital mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2001. Given that 
neither the estimates of price per bed published in the literature nor the estimates 
calculated in this study are adjusted for inflation and given that the hospitals analyzed in 
this study tend to be larger, better performing hospitals than both the average U.S. 
hospital and any hospital likely to be acquired in a merger or acquisition, the equity 
values derived in this study appear to produce reasonable estimates of hospitals’ market 
value of equity. 
 As expected, residual income and discounted cash flow based equity values for 
each of the 3,310 hospital year observations were not numerically identical but positively 
correlated as shown by a correlation coefficient of 0.21 (p-value < 0.001). In theory, 
under the same set of assumptions, residual income and discounted cash flow valuation 
are expected to result in identical estimates of firms’ equity values (see Appendix B). In 
practical applications, however, equity values calculated using residual income valuation 
differ from equity values calculated using discounted cash flow valuation due to the 





 Both residual income and discounted cash flow based equity values, on the other 
hand, were only weakly associated with residual income based operating equity values. 
The correlation coefficient between the two residual income based equity values was 0.03 
(p-value = 0.14) and the correlation coefficient between discounted cash flow based 
equity values and residual income based equity values based on operations was 0.06 (p-
value = 0.002). These results were not unexpected. Hospitals that perform well 
financially and are able to grow their equity capital with the help of endowments and 
financial investments do not necessarily earn most of their income from the provision of 
patient care. Indeed, given that almost 40 percent of U.S. hospitals currently have 
negative patient margins (American Hospital Association 2009) these hospitals may have 
to rely more extensively on non-operating revenues in order to remain profitable and 
build equity, partially because of their comparatively poor operating performance.  
 
Revenue cycle management performance 
Hospitals in the largest of the four samples analyzed in this study (the sample used to 
analyze hospitals’ profitability) recorded a median of 59.1 days and an average of 60.8 
days in net accounts receivable during 2000 to 2007 (Table 4.3). Average collection 
periods varied considerably across hospitals as shown by the sample between group 
standard deviations of 14.4 days. Average collection periods varied somewhat less within 
hospitals as evidenced by the within group standard deviation of 9.9 days. Average case 
mix adjusted net patient revenue per total assets equaled 0.64, i.e., hospitals collected an 
average of 64 cents in case mix adjusted net patient revenue for each dollar invested in 





periods, average net patient revenue per total assets varied considerably across hospitals 
(as shown by the between group standard deviation of 0.25) but less within hospitals (as 
shown by the within group standard deviation of 0.08). These results did not differ 
substantially from the descriptive results for the independent variables in the samples 
used to analyze residual income and discounted cash flow based equity values, which 
were therefore omitted in Table 4.3.  
 
Control variables 
Between 2000 and 2007, the sample hospitals provided an average of 97,950 days of 
patient care per year and their net patient revenues grew at an average annual rate of 8.6 
percent (Table 4.3). They reported an average of 19.1 days in days in accounts payable. 
Their average age of their property, plant, and equipment was 9.9 years. 27 percent of 
hospitals’ assets represented financial assets and 48 percent of all assets were financed 
with debt. Again, these descriptive results did not differ much from the descriptive results 
for hospital in the samples used to analyze residual income and discounted cash flow 
based equity values, which were therefore not included in Table 4.3. Moreover, as shown 
in Table 4.2, the average number of licensed beds was 426. An average of 21.6 percent of 







Table 4.3: Descriptive Results 












Total profit margin 3.88 3.93 (4.35) 3.79 2.82 
Operating profit margin 1.63 1.18 (4.58) 4.35 2.60 
Free cash flow $3,544,500 $7,295,772 
($37,212,600) 
$24,421,640 $29,318,990 
Hospital equity values (in 000s) 





Residual income based 










Revenue cycle management performance 
Days in net accounts 
receivable 
59.12 60.76  
(16.85) 
14.40 9.94 
Net patient revenue per total 
assets 




Days in accounts payable 15.9 19.10  
(11.61) 
11.62 4.63 
Average age of property, 
plant, and equipment 
9.6 9.93  
(2.70) 
2.58 1.21 
Financial asset ratio 0.27 0.27  
(0.15) 
0.14 0.056 
Debt financing ratio 0.48 0.48  
(0.16) 
0.16 0.052 
Patient days 53,764 97,950 
(172,584) 
164,960 15,484 




Notes: Summary statistics for the independent and control variables are calculated for the largest of the 
three samples, the sample derived for the analysis of hospital profitability, which included 6,062 hospital 
year observations. Descriptive results for the independent and control variables for the sample used to 
analyze both residual income and discounted cash flow based equity values are very similar to the results 
presented above and are thus not presented in Table 4.3. Summary statistics for the number of licensed 






Multivariate regression results 
Hospital profitability  
Effective revenue cycle management is associated with improved hospital profitability 
(Table 4.4). As expected, all three regressions find negative coefficients on days in net 
accounts receivable and positive coefficients on net patient revenue per total assets. A 
decrease in the average collection period by one day was associated with increases in 
total and operating profit margins of 0.068 and 0.065 percentage points, respectively, as 
well as an increase in free cash flows of $50,830. These findings are consistent with prior 
empirical evidence for for-profit firms in various industries besides health care (Deloof 
2003; Lazaridis and Tryfonidis 2006; Shin and Soenen 1998; Soenen 1993; Wang 2002) 
and provide statistical evidence that the positive relationship between the effective 
management of accounts receivable and profitability also applies to not-for profit 
hospitals.  
Moreover, an increase in net patient revenue per total assets of one percentage 
point was associated with an increase in total profit margin of 0.02, an increase in 
operating profit margin of 0.03, and an increase in free cash flow of $12,971 providing 
seminal empirical evidence that, besides accounts receivable management, managing the 
amount of patient revenue plays an important role for not-for-profit hospitals’ 
profitability.  
 Almost all coefficients on the control variables included in the model were of the 
expected sign and highly significant (Table 4.4). As expected, both total and operating 
profit margins increased with increases in the growth in patient revenues and the 





in the proportion of assets financed with debt and the average payment period. However, 
while total profit margin increased with increases in the average age of property, plant, 
and equipment operating profit margins decreased slightly as the hospital’s fixed assets 
got older. Furthermore, free cash flows increased with the volume of care provided and 
the proportion of assets held in financial assets and decreased with the number of days 







Table 4.4: Regression Analysis of Hospital Profitability 













Revenue cycle management 
performance 
   






















   






















































 .21 .17 .15 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors are in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 5 
percent confidence level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Independent 






Hospital equity value 
Effective revenue cycle management is associated not only with improved profitability 
but also with higher equity values (Table 4.5). While all three regressions found negative 
coefficients on days in net accounts receivable, only the one in the analysis of discounted 
cash flow based equity values was statistically significant. A decrease in days in net 
accounts receivable by one day was found to be associated with an increase in discounted 
cash flow based equity values of $4,009,301. Moreover, all three regressions found 
positive coefficients on net patient revenue per total assets. Again, only the coefficient in 
the analysis of discounted cash flow based equity values was statistically significant 
indicating that an increase in net patient revenues per total assets by one percentage point 
was associated with an increase in discounted cash flow based equity values of 
$9,110,706.  
The coefficients on the control variables included in the model were, for the most 
part, not statistically significant with the exception of the analysis of discounted cash 
flow based equity values (Table 4.5). Besides the amount and the speed of revenue 
collection the two other factors that explained changes in discounted cash flow based 
equity values were a hospital’s debt financing ratio and its proportion of assets invested 
in financial assets. Discounted cash flow based equity values increased with increases in 







Table 4.5: Regression Analysis of Hospital Equity Values (in 000s) 
Variables Residual income 
based equity value 
Residual income 
based equity 












Revenue cycle management 
performance 
   









Net patient revenue per 












   



























































State dummies 49 included 48 included N/A 
Hospital fixed or random 
effects 




 .0067 .021 .33 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors are in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 5 
percent confidence level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Independent 






Sensitivity analyses were conducted to determine whether the results for hospitals’ equity 
values were robust to the use of different subsamples of bond-issuing, not-for-profit 
hospitals and to variations in some of the key assumptions made in the calculation of 
hospitals’ equity values. First, due to different data requirements, three separate samples 
were derived to calculate and analyze hospitals’ equity values. While the hospitals in 
these three samples did not differ substantially from all bond-issuing, not-for-profit 
hospitals in terms of their organizational characteristics their financial performance was 
notably better (Table 4.2) and hospitals for which discounted cash flows could be 
calculated reported the strongest financial performance. The above finding of a lack of 
statistically significant relationships between revenue cycle management performance 
and not-for-profit hospitals’ residual income based equity values may thus be the result of 
using samples that include broader ranges of hospitals whose financial performance is, on 
average, somewhat weaker and may not be robust to using a sample that includes only the 
most profitable hospitals. Additional analyses of the relationship between revenue cycle 
management performance and residual income based equity values for the subset of 
highly profitable hospitals for which both residual income and discounted cash flow 
based equity values were available, however, provided little evidence for this 
explanation. With the exception of the coefficient on net patient revenue per total assets 
in the analysis of residual income based equity values, which remained positive but 
became statistically significant, none of the results changed. The above findings thus 






Moreover, the calculation of both residual income and discounted cash flow based 
equity values requires a number of assumptions and the results obtained may be an 
artifact of the specific set of assumptions made. Sensitivity analyses, however, showed 
that the findings for both residual income and discounted cash flow based equity values 
were relatively robust to changes in several of the key assumptions. In the calculation of 
residual income based equity values, for instance, assuming long-term growth rates of 
zero or three percent rather than one percent did not affect the results. Likewise, 
redefining a hospital’s forecasted return on equity as the weighted average of its return on 
equity over the past three years did not change the findings. Moreover, excluding 
observations with negative residual income based equity values or, alternatively, 
replacing the estimated equity value with the book value in those cases in which residual 
income based equity values were smaller than equity book values did not produce 
substantially different findings. 
Likewise, the findings for discounted cash flow based equity values were 
relatively robust to variations in their calculation including redefining the forecasted free 
cash flow as the simple average of the free cash flows over the past five rather than three 
years and using a lower average growth rate of three percent, which mirrors the average 
annual GDP growth during the study period, rather than using an average annual growth 
rate of 7.3 percent. Furthermore, excluding observations with negative equity values or, 
alternatively, replacing estimated equity values with equity book values in those cases in 
which discounted cash flows based equity values were smaller than equity book values 






One of the most important findings of this study is that not-for-profit hospitals’ 
profitability is clearly linked to their performance at managing the revenue cycle. This 
research thus provides seminal empirical evidence that successful revenue cycle 
management is not only associated with improved profitability of for-profit firms but also 
plays an important role in the financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. As 
expected, greater amounts of patient revenue and faster collection periods are associated 
with improved operating and, to a somewhat smaller degree, total profit margins. As 
hospitals adopt more aggressive pricing policies and reduce revenue deductions and 
write-offs, their operating revenue increases, which results in higher operating income 
and, consequently, operating margins (Cody, Friss, and Hawkinson 1995). Higher patient 
revenue also has a positive, albeit smaller, effect on total margins. While operating 
income represents an important element of net income, the latter also depends on non-
operating activities, in particular the efficient management of endowments and financial 
investments (Solucient 2005). Especially larger, well performing, not-for-profit hospitals, 
such as the ones analyzed in this study, have been found to generate substantial amounts 
of non-operating income (Cleverley 1990), which may be the most important reason for 
why net patient revenue per total assets displays a stronger link with operating rather than 
total profit margins. 
Besides the amount of patient revenue, the speed with which hospitals collect 
their revenue plays an important role for their profitability. Shorter collection periods are 
associated with improvements in both operating and total profit margins. Collecting 





consequently, its need for short-term financing and thus its interest expenses. Reduced 
interest expenses translate into higher operating and net income and improved profit 
margins. Unlike net patient revenue per total assets, which is more strongly associated 
with a hospital’s operating performance, days in net accounts receivable displays an 
almost equally strong link with both operating and total profitability. Given that — 
similar to increases in net patient revenue — reductions in interest expenses have a direct 
effect on a hospital’s operating performance but only an indirect effect on its total 
profitability, this finding may indicate that hospital managers use surplus cash as a result 
of shorter collection periods not only to reduce their organizations’ short-term liabilities 
but also to invest in short-term securities, which produce additional investment income 
and, consequently, increase non-operating income.  
Furthermore, as expected, greater amounts of patient revenue and shorter 
collection periods are associated with higher free cash flows. Generating more patient 
revenue results in additional cash inflows from patients and third-party payers, which 
boosts a hospital’s cash flow from operations, one of the major components of its free 
cash flow. Likewise, each reduction in accounts receivable results in a one-time cash 
inflow as it reduces a hospital’s investment in working capital and thus increases its free 
cash flow. While previous research has suggested that there may be a link between 
effective working capital management and firms’ free cash flow (Jose, Lancaster, and 
Stevens 1996; Soenen 1993), no empirical studies have tested this hypothesis. This 
research thus provides seminal empirical evidence that there is indeed a positive 





financial management — its management of the revenue cycle — and its free cash flow, 
at least in the case of not-for-profit hospitals. 
A second important finding of this study is that improved revenue cycle 
management performance is associated with not-for-profit hospitals’ abilities to grow 
their equity capital. The strength of this relationship, however, depends on the valuation 
technique used. The link between revenue cycle management performance and hospitals’ 
ability to grow equity is particularly strong for equity value estimates based on 
discounted cash flow valuation. As shown in the analysis of hospital profitability, 
effective revenue cycle management is strongly and positively associated with free cash 
flow, one of the main elements of discounted cash flow valuation. Not surprisingly, 
greater amounts of patient revenue and shorter collection periods are thus also associated 
with higher discounted cash flow based equity values. Given that corporate finance 
theory has long considered short-term financial management to be irrelevant for the value 
of the firm (Lewellen, McConnell, and Scott 1980) this study of not-for-profit hospitals 
provides empirical evidence that, in practice, market imperfections may allow managers 
to use short-term financial management strategies, such as revenue cycle management, to 
grow their organizations’ equity. 
The link between revenue cycle management performance and hospitals’ ability 
to grow equity, however, is weaker when hospitals’ equity values are estimated using 
residual income valuation. As described above residual income valuation defines a 
hospital’s equity value based on its reported accounting earnings, in particular its net 
income, a measure of its total profitability. Hence, the relationship between revenue cycle 





revenue cycle management performance and hospitals’ total margins. As expected and 
consistent with the findings for total margins, the amount of a hospital’s patient revenues 
is positively and the length of its collection period is negatively associated with residual 
income based equity values. Unlike in the analysis of total profit margins, however, the 
coefficients on net patient revenue per total assets and days in net accounts receivable are 
not statistically significant, which may partially be the result of attenuation bias due to 
the fact that accounting values were used in the calculations, which tend to be vulnerable 
to managerial earnings management.  
Like many for-profit firms, not-for-profit hospitals have been found to engage in 
substantial manipulations of earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Leone and Van 
Horn 2005). Empirical evidence suggests that not-for-profit hospitals have an incentive to 
manage earnings to a range just above zero both by adjusting discretionary spending 
(Hoerger 1991) and by taking advantage of the subjective nature of certain accounting 
accruals, such as the allowance for bad debt expenses (Berger 2008). Accounting 
manipulations may thus reduce the variance in hospitals’ reported earnings and residual 
income based equity values while also changing hospitals’ indicators of revenue cycle 
management performance. Manipulations of the allowance for bad debt expenses, for 
instance, not only result in misrepresentations of a hospital’s earnings but also affect its 
accounts receivable. Hospitals with high positive earnings may increase their allowance 
for bad debt expenses to reduce their reported earnings. This manipulation, however, also 
translates into lower balances in accounts receivable and thus shorter collection periods. 
Hospitals with low negative earnings, on the other hand, may have an incentive to 





leads to higher balances in accounts receivable and longer collection periods. As a result, 
both days in net accounts receivable and equity values calculated based on reported 
earnings decrease for well performing hospitals and increase for poorly performing 
hospitals biasing the slope coefficient on days in net accounts receivable toward zero 
(Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1: Effect of Managerial Earnings Management on the Relationship 
between Revenue Cycle Management Performance and Equity Values 
 
 
A final important finding of this study is that the pathway through which effective 
revenue cycle management contributes to a hospital’s long-term financial performance 
relies on improvements to its day-to-day operations, thus strengthening its operating 





hospitals’ operating rather than total profit margins and the findings for hospitals’ 
hypothetical equity values calculated under the assumption that all its equity is used in 
operations compared to the findings for hospitals’ total residual income based equity 
values provide some, albeit weak, additional evidence for this link. Analogous to the 
findings for hospitals’ operating margins, in the analysis of hospitals’ hypothetical equity 
values based solely on their operating performance, the coefficient on days in accounts 
receivable is positive and the coefficient on net patient revenue per total assets is 
negative. This result suggests that, in the hypothetical case in which hospitals used all 
their equity for the provision of patient care and were able to maintain their current 
operating performance, they would benefit more strongly from improved revenue cycle 
management performance compared to the status quo, in which they use only parts of 
their equity capital in operations. 
While in the expected direction, both regression coefficients, however, are only 
borderline statistically significant (p-values of 0.10 on days in net accounts receivable 
and 0.11 on net patient revenue per total assets). This finding may again be partially 
attributable to attenuation bias as a result of managerial earnings management. 
Continuing the discussion above, managerial earnings management may not only affect 
hospitals’ residual income based equity values but may also result in biased estimates of 
their hypothetical equity values based solely on operations. Manipulations of the 
allowance for bad debt expense, for instance, may not only lead to misrepresentations of 
a hospital’s net income but also of its operating income. As a result, the variance in both 
hospitals’ adjusted return on equity and their so-derived residual income based equity 





receivable increases as a result of manipulations of the allowance for doubtful accounts 
net patient revenue per total asset remains unchanged resulting in regression coefficients 
that are biased toward zero (Figure 4.1). 
 
Study limitations and future work 
Non-random samples of U.S. hospitals 
The hospitals analyzed in this study do not represent random samples of U.S. hospitals, 
which limits the generalizability of the findings. The Merritt Research Services database 
includes only bond-issuing, not-for-profit U.S. hospitals. These hospitals are generally 
larger and better performing than the average U.S. hospital — they have higher 
occupancy rates, lower average lengths of stay, greater cash reserves, and stronger 
operating and total profit margins. The subsets of hospitals analyzed for the purpose of 
this research are very similar to all bond-issuing, not-for-profit hospitals with the 
exception of financial performance where the former report even stronger results. The 
findings of this study thus likely hold true for larger, financially well-off, not-for-profit 
hospitals but may not be generalizable to smaller, poorer performing hospitals and 
caution should therefore be exercised when interpreting the findings.  
Moreover, the results may not generalize to for-profit hospitals, which have been 
found to differ from not-for-profit hospitals on a number of organizational and financial 
characteristics and which can grow equity not only by retaining and reinvesting earnings 
but also by issuing shares. A more complete picture of the relationship between revenue 





profitability and ability to grow equity thus awaits the analysis of a larger, more 
representative sample of U.S. hospitals. 
 
Measurement of the amount of patient revenue 
Measuring changes in the amount of revenue a hospital generates due to improved 
revenue cycle management in terms of net patient revenue per total assets has several 
limitations, which may affect the findings of this research as well as their interpretation. 
First, as discussed above, any increases in net patient revenue per total assets may be the 
result of both price and volume effects. Revenue cycle managers, however, focus most of 
their attention on increasing price by reducing revenue deductions and other write-offs 
and not on increasing patient volume. This study controls for the effect of changes in 
patient volumes by including the number of patient days as a control variable. Patient 
days, however, only reflect a hospital’s volume of inpatient care and do not take into 
account any outpatient care provided, which represents an increasingly important part of 
most hospitals’ business (American Hospital Association 2009).  
Moreover, increases in net patient revenue per total assets may also be due to 
changes in a hospital’s asset base rather than improved revenue cycle management. To 
control for changes in total assets, hospitals’ average age of property, plant, and 
equipment is included in the analysis. This variable, however, only takes into account 
changes in hospitals’ fixed assets and does not control for changes in current assets. 
Future work should thus employ alternative measures of hospitals’ ability to generate 





expressed as a proportion of gross patient revenue, to determine the robustness of the 
findings in this study. 
 
Estimation of not-for-profit hospitals’ equity values 
Since all the hospitals in this study are not-for-profit hospitals, market values of their 
equity capital are not available but had to be estimated with the help of residual income 
and discounted cash flow valuation techniques. In theory, under the same set of 
assumptions, both valuation models result in equal estimates of a firm’s equity value (for 
a mathematical proof, see Appendix B). My implementation of these models, however, 
relies on a number of simplifying assumptions and leaves much room for improvement. 
Both models employed in this study, for instance, rely solely on information about a 
hospital’s past performance and do not take into account information about current and 
future developments that may change historical earnings and cash flow trends. Analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, however, have been shown to contain more value-relevant information 
than historical accounting information alone (Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1999; Frankel 
and Lee 1998). The sole use of historical information may thus focus too much on the 
status quo and either overstated or understated hospital equity values, particularly for 
hospitals with extremely volatile earnings. Future work may be able to improve the 
estimation procedure by including analysts’ or managers’ earnings forecasts to take into 






Potential endogeneity of revenue cycle management 
The research design of this study does not allow me to determine whether revenue cycle 
management is endogenous, which may violate the assumptions of the linear regression 
model and lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. Revenue cycle 
management may be endogenous to hospitals’ profitability and ability to grow equity 
since revenue cycle management not only affects financial results but superior financial 
performance may also provide hospitals with the resources necessary to improve their 
management of the revenue cycle. This study discusses in great detail the pathways 
through which improved revenue cycle management is hypothesized to improve not-for-
profit hospitals’ profitability and free cash flow and strengthen their ability to build 
equity capital. Strong financial performance, however, may also enable hospital 
managers to focus more of their time and resources on managing the revenue cycle, both 
of which may be more readily available in organizations that perform well rather than in 
organizations that are struggling to remain in business. Financially well off hospitals 
may, for instance, have the resources to implement a more sophisticated billing and 
denials management system and thus reduce their outstanding accounts receivable and 
shorten their average collection periods.  
Endogeneity concerns may, however, be mitigated by empirical evidence that 
indicates that over the past decade not only the most profitable hospitals but hospitals 
across the board achieved substantial improvements in their revenue cycle management 
performance. Hospitals were able to not only boost their net patient revenue by 
continuing the aggressive pricing policy many of them had begun to adopt but also 





cycle management are indeed difficult and costly to introduce, such as the 
implementation of an electronic health record system that collects and connects all of a 
patient’s clinical and administrative data (Eldenburg, Schafer, and Zulauf 2004), others 
can be implemented by simply reorganizing and streamlining small but key aspects of the 
revenue cycle, such as standardizing the process of collecting patient information during 
registration through education and training sessions for the staff members involved (May 
2004). Future work will be needed to more fully address potential endogeneity problems 
in this research. One promising way to do so might be the use of instrumental variables. 
Instrumenting for revenue cycle management performance has the potential to address 




Successful management of the revenue cycle plays an important role in not-for-profit 
hospitals’ efforts to boost profitability, build equity capital, and thus remain financially 
viable in the long term. This link is found to be particularly strong for measures of 
hospitals’ operating performance indicating that the pathway through which revenue 
cycle management is associated with hospitals’ long-term financial performance focuses 
on operations. Hospital revenue cycle managers and consultants may view these findings 
positively. Managerial efforts aimed at increasing both the amount and the speed of 
patient revenue collection may be worthwhile investments that have the potential to make 
a difference in the organization’s long-term financial performance. Being able to grow 





increases their access to debt financing, both of which represent key factors when it 
comes to maintaining the up-to-date facilities and equipment needed to attract well-






Appendix A: Accounting errors and distortions and the residual income valuation 
model 
The following example developed by Lundholm and Sloan (2004) demonstrates that the 
residual income valuation model is relatively resilient to accounting errors and distortions 
if the forecasts anticipate the unraveling of any accounting errors or distortions in future 
accounting periods. Let the sequence of forecasted equity book values and net income be 
B0, NI1, B1, NI2, B2, NI3, B3, etc until infinity. Then the residual income valuation model 
defines the value of the firm's equity as: 
 
Let there be an accounting distortion in the form that $K is missing from B0, for 
instance because of an investment in research and development that cannot be capitalized 
but is forecasted to pay off in year 1. Correcting this distortion in the residual income 
model by adding K to the book value of equity in year 0 and subtracting it from net 









Similarly, if the additional value materializes in year 2 (or in any other year), the residual 










Appendix B: Derivation of the residual income valuation model from the discounted 
dividend model  
In corporate finance, the value of the firm has traditionally been defined as the present 
value of its expected future dividends (Frankel and Lee 1998). Not-for-profit firms, 
however, do not pay dividends and discounted dividend models can thus not be used to 
estimate the value of these organizations. There are, however, two alternative valuation 
models that are suitable for valuing not-for-profit organizations, discounted cash flow 
valuation and residual income valuation. While discounted cash flow valuation models 
focus on free cash flows, residual income valuation models express value in terms of 
accounting residual income flows (Lundholm and Sloan 2004). Free cash flows can either 
be obtained directly or, under the assumption of the clean surplus relation, which states 
that a firm's book value of equity can only be changed by dividends or earnings (Ohlson 
1995; Stowe et al. 2007), free cash flows can be computed based on net income and the 
change in common equity as shown in an example developed by Lundholm and Sloan 
(2004). That is, 
 
where Bt and Bt–1 represent the book value of equity in period t and t–1, respectively, NIt 









Discounting these cash flows at the cost of equity capital renders the building 
block of all valuation models, the discounted divided model, shown formally as: 
 
The residual income valuation model can be derived from this model starting with the 
discounted dividend model and writing dividends as: 
 
For each future period, RIt + rE*Bt−1 is substituted for NIt, where RIt represents the 
residual income of period t, re represents the cost of equity capital and Bt−1 and NIt are 
defined as before. The first term in the calculation of V0 (when t = 1) can then be written 
as: 
 
Analogously, the second term in the calculation of V0 (when t = 2) can be written as: 
 







The residual income model can thus be built term by term. Every time another term is 
added the appropriately discounted RIt term is added and the last term in the previous 
sum is cancelled. We can thus write: 
 
Since the summation is indefinite, the last term is pushed out indefinitely far into the 
future, and hence has a present value of zero. So, we can summarize and write V0 as 
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This dissertation research examined several questions surrounding the financial benefits 
of effective revenue cycle management from the perspective of hospitals. Specifically:  
1. What are the financial benefits of effective hospital revenue cycle management? 
Is there a trade-off between the amount of patient revenue hospitals earn and the 
speed with which they collect patient revenue? 
2. What are the determinants of hospital revenue cycle management performance? 
How does payer mix, in particular the proportion of publicly insured patients, 
affect hospitals’ revenue cycle management performance? Do government payers 
indeed undermine hospitals’ ability to generate and collect patient revenue as is 
frequently claimed by hospital practitioners? 
3. What is the link between revenue cycle management performance and hospitals’ 
long-term financial viability? Does effective revenue cycle management improve 
hospitals’ profitability? Does effective revenue cycle management strengthen 
hospitals’ ability to grow equity capital? 
 
What prompted this research was a desire to define and explore the financial 
benefits that hospitals derive from effective revenue cycle management in today’s 





and billing requirements, more thorough preauthorization and precertification, 
underpayments, and greater delays in payments. Despite the continued interest of hospital 
practitioners and numerous publications on revenue cycle management in the practitioner 
literature (Danielson and Fuller 2007; D’Cruz and Welter 2008; May 2004), revenue 
cycle management has not received much attention in health care finance research. This 
dissertation sought to complement existing anecdotal evidence and fill some of the gaps 
in the revenue cycle management literature. 
Starting with a brief description of current hospital revenue cycle management 
practices, Chapter 2 provided the background and foundation for all three studies that 
comprise this dissertation. Then, Chapter 2 proposed several measures of the financial 
benefits of effective revenue cycle management in terms of increases in the amount and 
the speed of patient revenue collection. Given the complexity of the revenue cycle, 
hospital managers frequently use a wide range of internal performance measures to assess 
the performance of each component of the revenue cycle (May 2004). Most of these 
performance indicators are neither standardized and comparable across institutions nor 
publicly available. By suggesting aggregate performance measures based on externally 
available financial statement information, Chapter 2 provided researchers and other 
external stakeholders with a framework to assess hospitals’ performance at managing the 
revenue cycle.  
Chapter 2 also provided empirical evidence on the relationships among these 
aggregate financial indicators of effective revenue cycle management. Using financial 
statement data for California hospitals for 2004 to 2007, correlation analysis showed that 





generated and the speed with which they collected their revenues but that these financial 
benefits often went hand in hand. Chapter 2 thus provided early indication that effective 
revenue cycle management achieves multiple positive results. Additional analyses of 
Medicare Cost Report data for all U.S. hospitals as well as audited financial statement 
data for bond-issuing, not-for-profit hospitals confirmed these findings indicating that 
they appear to be representative not only of California hospitals but of a majority of U.S. 
hospitals (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1: Relationships among Measures of the Amount and the Speed of Patient 
Revenue Collection 
Data set Time period Spearman’s rho 
correlation coefficient (p-
value in parentheses) 
Financial statement 
information for California 
hospitals provided by the 
Office of Statewide Health 
Planning and Development 
2004 – 2007 –0.0509 
(0.052) 
Medicare Cost Report 
information for all U.S. 
hospitals provided by 
Thomson Reuters 





hospitals provided by 
Merritt Research Services 









The development of aggregate indicators of the financial benefits of effective 
revenue cycle management provided the basis for the empirical analyses in Chapters 3 
and 4. More specifically, once hospitals that perform well at managing the revenue cycle 
could be identified and distinguished from those that perform poorly, two interesting 
research questions ensued: First, what factors determine whether hospitals perform well 
at revenue cycle management? And, second, does the effective management of the 
revenue cycle allow hospitals to strengthen their long-term financial viability? Chapter 3 
focused on the first question while Chapter 4 addressed the second question. 
Chapter 3 explored the determinants of hospitals’ performance at managing the 
revenue cycle with a particular focus on payer mix. Given the idiosyncrasies of the third-
party payer system, in which the prices a hospital charges do not equal the revenues it 
collects and the extension of credit is a business necessity rather than a managerial 
choice, the composition of a hospital’s payer mix is paramount to its ability to effectively 
manage the revenue cycle. Government payers in particular are under substantial pressure 
to contain ever increasing health care costs and hospital managers thus frequently claim 
that serving increasing numbers of publicly insured patients undermines their ability to 
generate adequate amounts of patient revenue and collect revenue in a timely fashion. 
Chapter 3, however, found no empirical evidence for this hypothesis. Using 
hospital financial information from the Medicare Cost Report for 2002 to 2007 and 
audited financial statements for bond-issuing, not-for-profit hospitals for 2000 to 2006, 
hospital-level fixed effects regression analysis found that hospitals with higher Medicare 
payer mix even collected somewhat more patient revenue while also collecting their 





neither the amount nor the speed of patient revenue collection. Hence, government payers 
did not appear to undermine hospitals’ ability to generate and collect patient revenue, a 
finding that may represent good news for many hospital practitioners. Rather than being 
driven mainly by external payment system forces, hospitals’ performance at revenue 
cycle management is likely the result of effective internal managerial practices. 
Chapter 4 built on Chapter 3 by exploring the link between effective revenue 
cycle management and not-for-profit hospitals’ long-term financial performance. 
Corporate finance theory posits that in perfectly efficient financial markets, short-term 
financial management, such as revenue cycle management, affects neither the 
profitability nor the market value of a firm since investing in short-term assets does not 
generate any excess returns (Cohn and Pringle 1980; Lewellen, McConnell, and Scott 
1980). Not-for-profit hospitals, however, do not face perfect capital markets (Reiter 
2004). Hence, in practice, revenue cycle management, one of the most important 
elements of hospitals’ short-term financial management, may allow hospital managers to 
boost their organizations’ profitability and strengthen their ability to grow equity capital.  
The results of Chapter 4 confirmed this hypothesis. Hospital-level regressions of 
audited financial statement data for bond-issuing, not-for-profit hospitals for 2000 to 
2007 found positive relationships between revenue cycle management performance and 
both profitability and not-for-profit hospitals’ ability to grow equity. Higher amounts and 
greater speed of patient revenue collection were positively associated with several 
indicators of hospitals’ profitability, including operating and total profit margins and free 
cash flow, and their ability to grow equity, including both residual income and discounted 





hospitals’ operating performance providing early indication that the pathway through 
which revenue cycle management improves hospitals’ long-term financial performance 
focuses on operations.  
Together, the three studies that comprise this dissertation showed that, despite 
potentially unfavorable external market factors, such as high proportions of publicly 
insured patients, effective hospital revenue cycle management achieves multiple financial 
benefits in terms of both improved amounts and speeds of patient revenue collection and 
thus has the potential to boost hospitals’ profitability and strengthen their ability to grow 
equity capital, mainly through improvements to operating performance. 
 
Future work 
While the results of this dissertation are informative, substantial opportunities exist for 
extending the research on hospital revenue cycle management. Five areas of future work 
will be discussed in the following. First, while this dissertation defined and analyzed 
several aggregate financial measures of effective revenue cycle management, the analysis 
was based exclusively on indicators that could be derived from externally available 
hospital financial statements. Since detailed data on hospitals’ revenue cycle management 
policies and practices are generally not publicly available, this dissertation did not allow 
me to analyze internally used measures of revenue cycle management performance and 
determine which elements of the revenue cycle hospital managers focus on when 
attempting to improve its performance. Nor did this research allow me to analyze how 





performance at revenue cycle management. Hence, the way practitioners manage the 
revenue cycle remains a black box. 
Future work should explore in more detail any internal changes practitioners 
implement to improve their management of the revenue cycle. This would allow both 
researchers and practitioners to understand which components of the revenue cycle are 
paramount to its effective management. Due to data limitations, however, pursuing this 
line of research would require the collection of primary data. Qualitative or mixed-
methods research including case studies, interviews, and surveys may all provide avenues 
to shed light on the black box of revenue cycle management. Moreover, the use of 
qualitative research methods would allow researchers to extend their focus beyond 
financial benefits of effective revenue cycle management to include indicators of patient 
and employee satisfaction, two important but frequently neglected aspects of hospitals’ 
performance at managing the revenue cycle (Berger 2008).  
A second way this dissertation, in particular Chapter 3, may be extended is by 
exploring the effects of consumer driven health plans on hospitals’ performance at 
managing the revenue cycle (D’Cruz and Welter 2008). In recent years, consumer driven 
health has experienced rapid growth, which is reflected in an increasing number of 
Americans enrolled in high-deductible health insurance plans. The core feature of these 
plans is that the patient is responsible for paying a substantial deductible out of pocket 
before the health plan assumes any financial responsibility. In theory, consumer driven 
health thus places more financial responsibility on the patient and encourages patients to 






For providers, however, the rapid growth of high-deductible health plans has 
resulted in shifts in payment flows by introducing new parties into the revenue cycle. 
Under the traditional third-party payer system, insured patients have only limited 
financial contact with providers besides being responsible for generally small deductibles 
and co-payments. Consumer driven health plans, however, place the patient at the 
forefront of the revenue cycle. As financial responsibility shifts to the patient health care 
providers are seeing an increase in denials from third-party payers as claims below the 
deductible are returned as zero payments. As a result, improvements to the front end of 
the revenue cycle, in particular insurance verification and patient financial counseling, 
have become paramount to hospitals’ efforts to reduce revenue deductions and write-offs 
and increase patient revenue. Another significant challenge in the consumer driven health 
environment is the timely collection of patient revenues. Billings and collections from 
patients rather than third-party payers frequently result in delays in payments since the 
automated, computer-based claims transmission systems used to submit claims to third-
party payers cannot be used to bill individual patients. As hospital managers look to 
improve on the inefficiencies of revenue cycle management, these new industry dynamics 
are thus creating additional challenges to an already complex process.  
Future work should first explore in how far the percentage of patients enrolled in 
high-deductible health plans affects hospitals’ performance at managing the revenue 
cycle in terms of both the amount of patient revenue and the speed of revenue collection. 
Second, and maybe more importantly, research will be needed to explore how hospitals 
may adapt their management of the revenue cycle to maintain adequate amounts of 





patients in high-deductible health plans. Besides financial aspects, patient satisfaction 
with hospitals’ management of the revenue cycle will gain in importance in this 
environment since patient dissatisfaction may not only result in patients not paying 
promptly and fully but may also jeopardize hospitals’ future revenue opportunities. As 
discussed above, indicators of patient satisfaction should thus be included in future 
research. 
Third, future work should extend this research, in particular Chapter 4, to include 
not only revenue cycle management but also other elements of hospitals’ short-term 
financial management. In the current third-party payer environment, the generation and 
collection of patient revenue represent some of the most important aspects of hospitals’ 
working capital management. Besides managing the revenue cycle, however, the 
effectiveness of a hospital’s short-term financial management depends on its management 
of inventories and accounts payable. Like most service organizations, hospitals today 
have little investment in inventory (Smith 1980), which may therefore play only a minor 
role in their short-term financial management. Accounts payable, on the other hand, 
represent an important short-term liability as hospital managers may be able to extend 
payment periods to fund investments in short-term assets including patient receivables. 
Consequently, one aggregate measure to assess hospitals’ performance at short-term 
financial management is the difference between the number of days in accounts 
receivable and the number of days in accounts payable. This simplified version of the 
length of the cash conversion cycle measures the average number of days between the 





patient accounts after services have been provided indicating the efficiency with which 
cash flows through the organization. 
Future work should explore the link between the length of the cash conversion 
cycle and hospitals’ long-term financial viability to provide a more complete picture of 
how hospitals’ short-term financial management is associated with their long-term 
financial health. Finance theory posits that highly profitable firms may improve their 
short-term financial management performance by reducing their collection periods while 
simultaneously increasing their payment periods. Empirical studies, however, have found 
that highly profitable firms tend to have both shorter collection and shorter payment 
periods (Deloof 2003; Lazaridis and Tryfonidis 2006). The statistically significant 
negative coefficient on days in accounts payable, which was included as a control 
variable in the analysis of hospital profitability in Chapter 4, provided seminal empirical 
evidence that this relationship may also hold for not-for-profit hospitals. Additional 
research, however, will be needed to more fully understand the relationship between 
hospitals’ performance at managing all elements of their working capital and their 
profitability as well as their ability to grow equity capital. 
Fourth, this dissertation has examined the financial benefits of effective revenue 
cycle management from the perspective of health care providers but has largely ignored 
the payer side. As discussed in Chapter 2, the many components of a hospital’s revenue 
cycle provide practitioners with numerous opportunities to improve its management by, 
among other things, reducing existing administrative inefficiencies. Nonetheless, health 
care providers still spend enormous time and money trying to determine whether a patient 





that are wasted (Abelson 2010). To further reduce administrative inefficiencies, 
regulators and third-party payers will need to step up their efforts and partner with health 
care providers to help them improve their revenue cycle management. A first important 
step in this direction was the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, which promoted uniform billing and claims transmission 
standards. With these mandates in place, software development, uniform standards of 
practice, and clarity of coding and transmission requirements have all positively affected 
providers’ cash collections (Rauscher and Wheeler 2008).  
Besides regulatory action, however, as part of the recent discussion over how best 
to overhaul the U.S. health care system, payers have promised to do their part to contain 
costs by tackling the burdensome paperwork involved in submitting and paying medical 
claims (Abelson 2010). In early February 2010, several insurers including Aetna, Cigna, 
Blue Cross Blue Shield, and United Health Care announced a pilot program in the state of 
New Jersey that offers health care providers the ability to use a new web portal to check a 
patient’s coverage and track claims, regardless of which of the participating health plans 
the patient is enrolled in. A similar system implemented in Ohio in late 2009 was well 
received by participating providers. Nonetheless, many participating providers have 
indicated that additional efforts are needed to standardize and streamline the processes 
between payers and providers to further streamline the revenue cycle. 
Future work should evaluate these and other pilot projects to determine in how far 
they are able to make a difference in health care providers’ management of the revenue 
cycle. Moreover, it would be interesting to explore whether there are incentives for 





and benefits. In the health care management literature, a number of studies have used the 
concept of the business case for quality to evaluate whether investments in improvements 
of clinical care are able to generate financial win-win situations for both providers and 
payers, which would make their adoption more likely (Leatherman et al. 2003; Wheeler 
et al. 2007). I would be interested in extending the concept of the business case for 
quality beyond aspects of the quality of clinical care to include the quality of 
administering health care. The question I want to explore is whether the elimination of 
administrative inefficiencies in the process of paying for medical care can reduce costs 
for both providers and payers and thus result in a win-win situation. The existence of a 
positive business case for quality may then provide an incentive for both providers and 
payers to jointly implement systems that streamline health insurance paperwork and 
allow providers to improve their management of the revenue cycle. 
Finally, this dissertation relied on hospital financial information for some or all of 
the years from 2000 to 2007, the most recent years for which data was available. The 
findings of this research, however, may differ for different periods of time. With the 
passage of the health reform bill in March 2010, the U.S. health care system is set to 
undergo substantial transformations in the years to come. One of the most important 
changes will be the extension of health insurance coverage to more than 32 million 
currently uninsured Americans by 2014 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010). This provision 
clearly benefits hospitals as it increases their numbers of paying customers. Currently, 
uninsured and other self-pay patients are often unable or unwilling to pay their medical 
bills resulting in the loss of patient revenues for hospitals. Moreover, collections from 





their bills in installments over many months or even years, thus lengthening hospitals’ 
collection periods. Requiring almost all Americans to purchase health insurance coverage 
starting in 2014 will thus likely a have substantial impact on hospitals’ revenue cycle 
management performance. Near universal health insurance coverage not only reduces the 
number of unpaid medical bills and thus hospitals’ bad debt expenses but may also 
shorten the time that medical bills are outstanding.  
Future work should replicate some the analyses in this dissertation to explore how 
hospitals’ performance at managing the revenue cycle changes over time. Particularly 
during the coming decade, during which the U.S. will see major changes in the provision 
and financing of health care as a result of the passage of the health reform bill, hospitals’ 
revenue cycle management performance can be expected to improve substantially. 
Reexamining both the determinants and the financial benefits of effective revenue cycle 
management in this substantially different business environment has the potential to 
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